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Abstract: Turkey was the first Muslim state to recognize Israel in 1949 and since 
this time, military and economic bilateral relations have grown exponentially, par-
ticularly since the election of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in 2002. This evidence 
is indicative that, contrary to popular opinion, the AKP’s purportedly Islamic iden-
tity did not stand in the way of creating ties with Israel based on geo- strategic, 
economic and security realities. Although this remains the case in Turkey, as a 
democracy, the government is not immune to changes in public opinion and thus 
has developed a populist discourse on this matter. Consequently, Operation Cast 
Lead, Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident have left Turkish- Israeli diplomatic 
and political relations frozen and caused a key divergence from Turkey’s “zero- 
problems” policy in the region. Yet despite emphatic language, the divide between 
practice and discourse when it comes to Turkey’s ‘hard’ stance towards Israel is 
stark. Although vocally critical of Israel’s policies in Palestine, trade relations have 
remained immune to diplomatic difficulties and continue to increase under the 
AKP’s jurisdiction. Consequently, this chapter will examine the disjuncture be-
tween the continuously strong trading and economic relations between Israel and 
Turkey in the light of the diplomatic ice age, examining the domestic and inter-
national factors which dictate said relations. In order to provide a comprehensive 
examination of both discursive and practical transformations in Turkish Foreign 
Policy behaviour and the political economy of the AKP, the function and effect 
of domestic ideational, historical and cultural variables must be examined. Such 
variables dictate the complex political opportunity structure in which the AKP 
operates, and consequently, define the future relations of these two important re-
gional powers. Analysis of such contentious issues is increasingly important for 
understanding Turkey’s decision- making processes. Turkey’s future role as a re-
gional power, as well as their EU accession bid is predicated on the normalization 
of Turkish- Israeli relations. Not only do Turkish- Israeli relations speak volumes 
about the nature and purpose of the AKP’s power, but also implicitly define their 
limitations as a dominant actor in the international system.
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Changes in foreign policy formation under the AKP have come under heavy scru-
tiny, particularly since the commencement of their second term in 2007 and the 
arguable demise of Davutoğlu’s “zero- problems with neighbours” policy. Increas-
ing economic and diplomatic relations with contentious countries such as Iran and 
pre- revolutionary Syria are supposedly reflective of a shift in Turkey’s orientation 
from Western to Eastern facing. Equally, deteriorating diplomatic relations with Is-
rael are often cited as demonstrative of this shift in axis regarding Turkey’s foreign 
policy formation in the Davutoğlu era. Such reductionist and de- contextualised 
conclusions are generally based on the reflexive idea that an “Islamist” political 
party in Turkey will eschew Turkey’s European identity and Western alliances to 
re- kindle neo- Ottoman hegemony in the Middle East, utilising the Israeli issue as 
its flag- ship upon which to consolidate pan- Islamic values. Although having lost 
most of its credibility within academic circles due to empirical incoherence since 
the election of the AKP, arguments regarding Turkey’s shifting axis are still per-
vasive within the international policy- making community, with such Orientalist 
ideas visibly and palpably influencing policy and discourse on this matter which 
in turn, impacts upon the possible policy options and constraints facing the AKP. 
As such, this political rationale is at risk of becoming a self- fulfilling prophesy or 
set of prescriptive axioms.
The main thesis of this chapter is that the current stagnation in Turkish- Israeli 
political relations is due to to the democratisation of Turkey and the subsequent 
emergence of public opinion as a palpable factor in foreign policy formation. 
Moreover, as multiple interest groups emerge from Turkey’s recently established 
public sphere, the actions of the state are increasingly subject to alternative con-
testation. This multitude of actors and alternative contestations sometimes leads to 
contradictory or seemingly schizophrenic policy- making. The democratic nature 
of both Turkey and Israel means that public opinion is an important parameter, 
defining and constraining policy options and the opportunity for concessions on 
both sides which has entrenched the recent freeze in diplomatic relations. Simi-
larly, the growth of economic relations is motivated by domestic variables, and the 
continual attempts to fulfil the idealised, yet perhaps necessary goal of military, 
diplomatic and strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel.
To understand Turkish- Israeli political relations in contrast with economic ties, 
this chapter will map and asses three crucial events since the election of the AKP; 
Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Davos in 2009 and, the Mavi Marmara incident in 
2010. This will be tied into an analysis of discourse, practice and economic fluctua-
tions during this time period in order to identify the AKP’s foreign policy priorities 
and limitations. Moreover, this analysis will eschew the traditional dichotomies 
used regarding Turkey’s foreign- policy of “East” versus “West”, “secular” versus 
“Islamist” to take a more nuanced and holistic approach towards the asserted 
causality between public opinion, economic necessities and foreign policy forma-
tion in Turkey. Although Turkey’s hybrid identity of both Muslim and secular is 
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undoubtedly a factor, such static characterisations do little for developing an in- 
depth understanding of Turkey’s “political opportunity structure”1, and moreover, 
are more often taken for granted than examined.
The existing approaches are too ahistorical and acontextual, overlooking the 
coexistence of thriving trade with political confrontation between Turkey and Is-
rael. This paper will investigate the logic and decision- making behind this per-
ceived dichotomy by examining closely the evolution of Turkish- Israeli relations 
from 2000 to 2012. In doing so, it will reveal that this bifurcation of relations is 
by no means contradictory but can be comprehended by using the “political op-
portunity structure.” The use of the political opportunity structure for analysing 
Turkish foreign- policy is pertinent for a number of reasons. Firstly, the opening of 
the traditionally top- down Turkish state caused by economic liberalisation from 
the 1990s onwards allowed for increased “input” from social forces and non- state 
actors. Secondly, domestic and international changes to the political environment 
and state institutions between the 1990s and the 2000s, particularly EU accession, 
civilianisation of Turkey’s decision- making process and a deteriorating peace- 
process, had a deep impact on the characteristics and goals of social movements 
and the state. Thirdly, increased economic performance in the new millennium 
saw the rising effectiveness of Turkish foreign- policy, and with it, a growing ca-
pacity of society to influence the decision- making process. However, the growing 
coordination between domestic social movements and state decision- making can-
not be extracted from its international context. As such, I will synthesise my analy-
sis of the domestic political opportunity structure with an assessment of the wider 
structural, systemic and environmental forces at work. As such, the chapter will 
utilise public opinion data as well as post- positivist, broadly social constructivist 
analysis which privileges so- called “low politics” as constitutive of decisions made 
at state level. The aim is to put forth a deeper analysis of Turkish- Israeli relations 
than can be accounted for in traditional realist- based, positivist research which 
continues to dominate in Western political and social science. Such an analysis 
eschews the traditional focus on systemic forces and material realities as the only 
variables motivating foreign policy decisions, although they are incorporated into 
the analysis in the latter section.
The reason for employing post- positivist research over traditional approaches 
to Turkish foreign- policy such as structural realism is due to the identified rela-
tionship between public opinion and foreign- policy discourse and practice in the 
AKP era. One of the core impacts of which is that economic ties between Tur-
key and Israel which contrast with state rhetoric are often played down or even 
hidden. The crux of this contention is based on this chapters examination of the 
stark dichotomy between Turkish- Israeli political deterioration and their blossom-
ing economic relations, yet also on the consideration that the mentality behind 
1 For details of this theory see; Tarrow, Sidney G. (2011) Power in Movement: Social 
Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press.
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both is to establish Turkey as a regional hegemon. Such an assessment is key to 
determining Turkey’s future prospects as the vehement rhetoric abounding from 
the AKP regarding Israel is actually the core issue preventing this occurrence. Tur-
key’s recent exclusion and alienation from crucial Israeli- Palestinian peace- talks 
being exemplary of this contestation. Concurrently, with Turkish- Israeli relations 
suffering such dramatic fluctuations, it is difficult to understand the difference be-
tween reality and rhetoric, as such this chapter will examine discourse in contrast 
and convergence with practices, to determine the role of both leaders and public 
perceptions of the self and the Other, which are filtered through social narratives 
and historical memory,2 thereby playing an important role in the decision making 
process.
Erdoğan and Netanyahu are enigmatic leaders who at once command, but are 
also subject to, public opinion. It will be argued that their original perceptions of 
each other, and subsequent framing of events, entrenched the current antagonistic 
opinion within their societies, and this continued outside of their control to dictate 
the policy options available to both parties. Such an analysis is important, both due 
to how leaders discourse on the Other has been assimilated into society, and also, 
due to societies’ framing of events using moral rather than legal or political terms, 
as will be shown regarding Mavi Marmara. Such an analysis of image and belief 
systems of cognitive knowledge will highlight both the bottom up and top down 
aspects of foreign- policy formation, not only in an attempt to reveal the complex 
ideational, cultural and social variables influencing the decision- making process, 
but also to highlight where room for reconciliation lies; at societal rather than 
state level. Thus, four main concepts will be put across as the determinants of the 
fluctuations and limitations on Turkish- Israeli relations; narratives, frames, actor- 
understanding and public contestation, which interplay with regional and global 
dynamics to dictate the complex decision- making process of the AKP.
The End of the Golden Age
The convergences of Turkish and Israeli political identities and goals in the 1990s 
can be attributed to a few main factors which I will discuss, before going on to 
highlight the much more contentious and politically relevant divergences of the 
new millennium. In the 1990s, both Turkey and Israel perceived themselves as 
democratic outsiders in the region. They believed themselves to have mutual stra-
tegic interests in developing good economic, diplomatic and particularly military 
partnerships. Similarly, they have two of the most powerful military’s in West 
Asia, due to their domestic and regional threat perception, particularly regarding 
the issue of Syria, funding and sheltering the PKK and posing a strategic threat to 
Israel due to an ongoing state of war between the two countries. This perceived 
2 Taber, Charles S. (1998) “The interpretation of foreign policy events: A cognitive 
process theory”, in Sylvan and Voss (eds.) Problem Representation, pp. 29- 52.
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threat led to a limited amount of intelligence sharing during the so- called golden 
age of the mid to late 1990s. In the post Cold War global context of regional threat- 
perception and domestic securitisation which took place both in Turkey and in 
Israel, such cooperation was logical and also, domestically acceptable due to its 
emergence in tandem with a seemingly viable peace- process between Israel and 
Palestine. Yet the alliance formed from such mutual interests failed to take into 
account the impact of the changing political environment regarding threat per-
ception of key states such as Syria, Iraq and Iran. By linking cooperation with 
Israel so intimately to this securitised world view, once perception of what consti-
tutes a threat to Turkey changed, relations with Israel were bound to deteriorate. 
Compounded by the rise of civil- society actors, increased media freedoms and a 
change in the balance of civil- military relations, the new millennium brought forth 
a changing political opportunity structure for the successive Turkish government; 
the AKP. This de- securitised perception no longer believed that Turkey was “sur-
rounded on all sides by trouble.” or that “It is critical for [Turkey] to jump outside 
this circle of chaos and find friends in the region [and that] Israel was the perfect 
choice”.3 This meant that a strategic partnership with Israel became less imperative 
and more of a burden; the reason being the aforementioned emergence of public 
opinion as a defining constraint on state behaviour in Turkey.
International and domestic optimism regarding the progress made in the peace- 
process in the 1990s gave an element of social legitimacy to increasing relations 
with Israel in Turkey. However, this came to a decisive end with the start of the 
new millennium. In the early 2000s, the rise of Ariel Sharon’s administration, the 
death of the Oslo Peace Accords, and subsequent bloodshed of the Al- Aqsa Inti-
fada, combined with the 2006 occupation of Southern Lebanon, brought forth col-
lective historical memory of the Sabra and Shatila massacre, engendering growing 
anti- Israeli public opinion and a critical state discourse which would become the 
norm in Turkey. The development of more press freedoms encouraged and often 
entrenched such public consternation as successive Israeli actions in Gaza were 
televised and disseminated to the public, an act which simultaneously put pres-
sure on the government to behave in accordance with public sentiments. The vast 
civilian casualties suffered by the Palestinians in Jenin refugee camp in 2002 was 
received in Turkey with outrage, making relations with Israel more difficult to 
justify domestically. The subsequent controversial statement by the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Bülent Ecevit, which described these events as “genocide” may have done 
much for his domestic standing, but it also revealed to Israel the stark divide in 
threat perception, actor understanding and contrasting lenses through which the 
conflict was viewed in the two countries. Beliefs that profuse apologies on the 
Turkish side could have been enough to bridge this divide were quickly put an 
end to with the start of the Iraq war following shortly after, and the election of the 
3 Balci, A. and Kardaş, T. (2012) “The Changing Dynamics of Turkey’s Relations with 
Israel: An Analysis of ‘Securitization’”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 105.
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“Islamist” AKP. Both these developments brought about another major diversion 
from the “golden age” of strategic partnership and increased Othering, misunder-
standings and rivalries.
The Iraq war was perhaps the first example of polarisation in Israeli and Turk-
ish public opinion/policy formation. The Turkish public sphere was strongly 
against the war, in contrast with its Israeli counterpart. In 2003, the AKP was faced 
with the first international test of its leadership, identity and allegiance. The U.S 
requested permission for their military personnel to use Turkey as a base from 
which to attack Iraq. Arguments advocated by a number of U.S scholars suggest 
that Turkey made the decision not to allow U.S personnel in was based on concepts 
of Muslim Brotherhood, yet this argument does not hold up. Chomsky argues this 
point to the extreme, highlighting that the democratic and consultative process in 
Turkey far outstripped the American façade as the AKP was responding to public 
opinion, which notably stood at 95% against the U.S using Turkey as a base,4 with 
as many against the war in general.
If Israel believed Turkish policy regarding to Iraq was threatening, exactly the 
same could be said for Turkey. Israel’s support for the establishment of an in-
dependent Kurdish state, fracturing Iraq, was perceived as a highly threatening 
move to the integrity of the Turkish state. It was also a barely disguised move to 
keep Iraq, previously the leader of pan- Arabism, one of the most ideologically and 
physically threatening movements to Israel, divided, and thus weak. Given the 
rise of cross- border PKK attacks during the Iraq war, it is unsurprising that such 
support for an independent Kurdistan was not well received in Ankara. The subse-
quent derailment of the Turkish- Israeli strategic partnership stemmed from these 
events. Having previously believed Turkey to be on the same side, Israel correctly 
took these first, and key, divergences in interests and approaches to West Asian 
security as a sign of things to come. The previous, and arguably short sighted 
and optimistic focus on the points where Turkish and Israeli policy converged 
was superseded by an era in which previously ignored divergences dominated the 
 political discourse.
Turkey and Israel’s perceptions and methodologies regarding the maintenance 
of regional stability, the meaning of alternate actors’ behaviour and their concepts 
of threat- perception and alliance formation are based on cultural, geopolitical 
and strategic “realities”, and thus have all been subject to dramatic changes in the 
new millennium. Due to a series of misperceptions, erroneous judgements and 
misevaluations of the political opportunity structure in which actors must each 
develop their individual foreign- policy, coping mechanisms and mutual strategic 
interests have seemingly dissolved. This is particularly applicable in Turkey, where 
desecurisation and civilianisation led the decline of military power, dramatically 
4 Bell, A., “Interview with Noam Chomsky”, Hobo Magazine, October 6th, 2003, Avail-
able at: http://hobomagazine.com/post/26564542102/allen- bell- dr- chomsky-id-like- 
to- begin- this. 
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altering the organisational framework of the decision- making process. As such, 
the organisational actors have changed, particularly due to the entrance of society 
into policy formation, and also, the emergence of the “Islamist elite”, which as an 
ideational Other to the Israeli government, altered their perception and rhetoric 
towards Turkey, and subsequently their policy too.
The Multi- Dimensional Foreign Policy
The new millennium brought forth a new activism in Turkish foreign- policy; 
Davutoğlu’s multi- dimensional, “zero problems with neighbours”. The subsequent 
failure of this approach to maintain good ties with all of Turkey’s Western and 
Eastern neighbours is often held up as an example of Turkey moving towards the 
East, or the equally over- used cliché, “turning its back to the West”. However, this 
chapter argues that the original impetus for this foreign- policy was in line with EU 
and NATO interests- to promote regional peace and security. Moreover, its failure 
has been exaggerated, although, by nature, this policy was flawed from the start. 
Maintaining good diplomatic relations with neighbours as contrasting as Iran and 
Israel is demonstratively impossible, an issue which Anat Lapidot- Firilla succinctly 
brought attention to by describing “zero problems” as “the impossible mathemati-
cal equation.”5
Although accurate to an extent, Lapidot- Firilla’s understanding of Turkish 
foreign- policy as reflective of naïveté and lack of experience is too scathing and 
ignores the complexities of the decision- making process in Turkey, as an emerging 
economic player accountable to pubic opinion. As such, its economic aims includ-
ed diversification of its export markets due to the gap left by Europe’s recession. 
This chapter promotes an alternative understanding of the AKP’s decision- making 
process as one driven by a combination of public interest, material necessities and 
a dose of wishful thinking regarding normative moral statements aimed at Israel’s 
treatment of Palestinians. This position undermines Lapidot- Firilla’s elegantly 
phrased, if unsubstantiated assertion that “Turkish policy makers have adopted an 
outlook that sacrifices interests on the altar of absolute and universal morality”.6
Turkey’s “zero problems” policy stems from its very difference perception of 
regional security issues and resolution methods than the one employed by Israel. 
Turkey is highly dependent on maintaining relations with contentious countries 
such as Sudan, Lebanon and particularly Iran, for much needed energy resources. 
Despite intense efforts to diversify due to pressure from U.S sanctions, Iranian im-
ports currently stand at 20% of Turkey’s total natural gas consumption, a number 
increasing every year, with Iran providing a further 51% of Turkey’s crude oil re-
sources. Turkey’s dialogue and diplomacy efforts with countries such as Syria and 
5 Lapidot- Firilla, A. (2010) “Turkey: From State to Faith- Based NGO”, The Van Leer 
Jerusalem Institute.
6 Lapidot- Firilla, op cit.
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Iran, and indeed attempts at conflict resolution between Israel, Syria and Hamas, 
represent the AKP’s wish to establish Turkey as regional interlocutor but also its 
economic and security requirements. Furthermore, Turkey’s perception of stability 
certainly includes Israel, which is also reflective of their interdependence regard-
ing military cooperation and technological assistance, combating mutual terror 
threats, business and tourism partnerships, and energy and economic needs, which 
will be discussed later, in the final section of this chapter. However, Turkey also 
understands the Israeli- Palestinian conflict as one of the core obstacles to peace in 
West Asia, and as such, these strategic partnerships are being superseded by a era 
dominated by politicised and economically based decision making rather than the 
securitised cooperation of the “golden era.”
Turkey’s support of Iran’s supposedly benign nuclear programme stems at 
least partially from its perception of Israel. Given Israel almost certainly possesses 
nuclear weapons, condemning Iran for enriching uranium for energy purposes 
seems hypocritical and counter- intuitive to Turkey. Similarly, Israel’s perception 
of Turkey’s relationship with Iran as precluding relations with Israel, due to Iran’s 
constant denial of Israel’s right to exist and provocative discourse to match, can 
be seen as one of the main triggers of deteriorating diplomatic ties. Turkey and 
Brazil’s efforts in May 2009 to broker a deal in which half of Iran’s enriched ura-
nium could be exchanged for a Turkish medical research reactor and their mutual 
vote against increasing sanctions on Iran was interpreted within Israel as both a 
dangerous unilateral decision and as an example of Turkey’s purported axis shift. 
However, this issue should be read as exemplary of Turkey attempting to establish 
itself as a core regional mediator, as despite eschewing Western policy regarding 
the nuclear issue, they have been key in the negotiations with Iran.
As with the Iran nuclear issue, Israel perceives Ankara’s “friendly” relations with 
Hamas as a highly threatening development. However, Ankara’s relations with 
Hamas are actually quite limited, possibly due to the lack of enthusiasm within 
the Turkish public sphere for this organisation.7 The AKP’s tepid support is pretty 
much constrained to the world of rhetoric and Turkey certainly does not support 
them in any dangerous material sense such as through the provision of arms. Once 
again, the rupture in Turkey- Israeli relations caused by Ankara’s relationship with 
Hamas is both exaggerated and a matter of Turkish public opinion. The Turkish 
population is highly reactive to developments in Gaza and the AKP, unlike Israel 
and most of the Western world, believe Hamas to be a legitimately elected (al-
though certainly not desirable) government. As such, the policy of negotiating with 
Hamas directly is entirely pragmatic. Turkey has pushed for further involvement of 
Hamas in peace- talks, something Israel has unequivocally rejected.
Yet Turkey’s understanding of the compelling reasons to negotiate with Hamas 
is no longer confined to “Islamist” governments, who are presumed sympathisers. 
7 Pew Research Center, 2012 Survey Data, Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/da
tabase/?indicator=35&country=224. 
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This opinion is beginning to reach mainstream academic and policy analysis, as 
well as a variety of EU countries. Rather than viewing Turkey’s mediation efforts 
as a negative development based on an Islamist ideology, they can instead be 
seen as an attempt by Turkey to continue its negotiating tactics with the aim of 
regional security. According to an interview with the International Crisis Group, 
a senior AKP official discussed the pragmatic motivations for facilitating dialogue 
with Hamas when Khaled Mashal visited Turkey in 2006, stating that; “To the ex-
tent we have influence over Hamas, we use it for positive purposes. When Khaled 
Mashal came to Ankara, we told him, ‘now you’ve won an election, make the best 
of it, integrate; you’re not just a resistance group any more; work within the sys-
tem’. Hamas was ready for this but then came the [Western] policies of isolation 
[against Hamas] and the whole thing failed.” The AKP apparently used this time 
in order to convince Mashal both of Israel’s right to exist, and also of the benefits 
of pursuing dialogue as a means to conflict resolution. Such an example of the 
positive effects of Turkish mediation and the possibilities it opens up for future 
relations with both Hamas and Israel was also seen in 2011, when Turkey directly 
participated in brokering the deal with Hamas which finally ensured the release 
of captured Israeli soldier, Gilat Shalit, in exchange for over a thousand Palestin-
ian prisoners of Israel, a portion of whom Turkey took in. Furthermore, despite 
Israel’s criticism of Ankara- Hamas relations, this certainly cannot be viewed as 
one of the main factors leading to the deterioration of Turkish- Israeli relations, 
as that particular landslide did not really begin until, 2008 when Operation Cast 
Lead was initiated. The Turkish criticism which arose from this was not linked to 
Hamas’s legitimacy or democratic credibility, but rather to the suffering of Pal-
estinian civilians, which is assimilated into Turkish societies culture and history 
as an important national cause, and thus, was reflected in state discourse, in both 
secular and Islamic narratives. Nevertheless, this unilateral act aimed at endow-
ing Hamas with a modicum of international legitimacy was very badly received 
in Israel, as both of symbol of the AKP’s purportedly Islamic identity and as a 
decisive move away from coordinated decision making with the U.S and the EU; 
a sign of Turkey’s axis shift.
The contrasting view taken here is that Turkish- Israeli relations were never on 
the stable ground they were perceived to be, thereby undermining the conceptu-
alisation that the purportedly Islamist identity of the AKP is the primary, or even 
a minor motivation in the secession of diplomatic ties or are part of a broader 
shifting axis. The relationship was never one based on trust, ideational alignment 
or mutually enforced defence, rather is was a relationship of convenience. Thus, 
when public opinion hardened towards Israel, the lack of popular support for con-
tinued diplomatic ties led to their effective dissolution. Yet both countries continue 
to expand their economic relations at an ever increasing rate, seemingly defying 
norms of economic interdependence necessitating a level of political cooperation. 
Notably, Turkish- Israeli trade relations peaked in 2008 and again in 2010, coincid-
ing with Operation Cast Lead and the Mavi Marmara incident respectively. Both 
these events initiated times of intense political instability between and within the 
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two countries, yet economic relations continued their growth, immune to politi-
cal strife, an anomaly which will be discussed at length in the final section of this 
chapter.
Thus, both the implementation and effect of Davutoğlu’s multi- dimensional 
foreign- policy can be said to be orientated towards economic development and 
regional stability, and not aimed exclusively at any country, particularly not only 
Turkey’s “Muslim brothers”. More accurate is that, as an effect of economic liber-
alisation from the 1990s onwards, the emergence of a strong and internationalised 
private sector and a rapidly expanding population, Ankara pushed its bounda-
ries of foreign relations further than any previous administration in an attempt 
to diversify and expand trading opportunities. The development of a strong West 
Asian component of Turkish Foreign Policy emerged as part of Davutoğlu’s three- 
pronged approach of “strategic depth” which “rests on its geographical and histori-
cal depth.”8 This approach reveals both the mentality and the pragmatism behind 
Turkey’s rekindling of Eastern relations and subsequent complex interdependence 
with contentious countries. This links to the role of perception in foreign- policy 
formation. The much espoused clichés about an Islamist government in Turkey 
leading the country back to the East were assimilated into Israeli foreign- policy, 
but really consolidated under Netanyahu when he was re- elected in 2009. The 
Israeli government perceived changes, such as Turkey’s increasing relations with 
Iran, as demonstrative of this shifting axis proposition, and consequently, like a 
spurned lover, increased the confrontational rhetoric.
Nevertheless, there has been a palpable re- orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy 
and economic cooperation Eastwards which requires analysis. With the EU in fi-
nancial meltdown and Turkey’s disillusioned populace unwilling to go down with 
it, it would appear natural that Turkey should turn to its Eastern neighbours to 
solidify economic and political relations and take up a more active global economic 
role. Its doing so does not implicitly entail the end of Turkish- Israeli relations, de-
spite having long created ruptures between Turkey and its Arab counterparts, nor 
is Turkey’s new active economic policy a major variable defining these countries 
recent interaction. Instead, Turkish- Israeli relations, or lack thereof, are demon-
strative of a different transformation in foreign policy formation, not based on 
an ideational Eastern orientation but rather on Turkish public opinion, increas-
ing self- confidence regarding Davutoğlu’s assertive foreign- policy and economic 
necessities. Moreover, the shift in economic relations eastwards actually encom-
passes Israel, as one of Turkey’s main export markets outside of the EU. Notably, 
such practices come into direct conflict with Turkey’s rhetoric, and as such, are not 
readily disseminated to the public.
8 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Interview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu”, Published in 
AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on 12 March 2012, Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.
tr/interview- by- mr_- ahmet- davuto%C4%9Flu- published- in- auc- cairo- review- _
egypt_- on- 12- march- 2012.en.mfa.
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Religious identity plays almost no part in the AKP’s foreign policy decision- 
making process, when compared to much more compelling factors such as public 
opinion, societal identities and event perception. Such assertions clash not only 
with mainstream Western discourse on Turkey’s foreign- policy behaviour but also 
with secularist narratives inside Turkey. In fact, Hürriyet Daily News’ contention 
that “the Islamist Erdoğan government… is clearly caught between burning hatreds 
– based on its religious ideology and seen most visibly in the case of Israel and Syr-
ian President Bashar al- Assad’s regime – and the need to appear to be what it is 
not.”9 is highly demonstrative of one part of the popular narrative on the AKP’s 
foreign- policy decisions. This shows a remarkable lack of understanding of the 
complexities of the political opportunity structure and the capacity of statesmen 
to react as humans rather than national machines. If a “burning hatred” of Israel 
exists within the AKP, it most certainly hasn’t dictated foreign- policy or even con-
troversial diplomatic decisions. In fact, given the escalation of events since the Da-
vos incident in February 2009, it remains surprising the Erdoğan’s rhetoric has not 
been more vehement, both due to the personal insult that was the failure of peace- 
talks with Syria, Peres’ denial of an apology over Davos, and most importantly, the 
lack of apology for Mavi Marmara until more that 2 years after the event, not to 
mention the regional support such denouncements of Israel engenders.
Furthermore, “a burning hatred- based on religious ideology” would seem to 
play into Orientalist ideas about a pre- determined and paradigmatic battle between 
Muslims and Jews. This has no resonance with the AKP’s practice or discourse. 
Erdoğan has always been very clear about the difference between criticising the 
Israeli government, and being anti- Semitic; “The Israeli state and the Israeli people 
are separate issues. I always say that anti- Semitism is a crime against humanity.”10 
Referring to the AKP’s religious ideals as a reason to be critical of Israel under-
mines the core issues of illegal occupation, settlement expansion and high civilian 
mortality, not to mention the ongoing blockade on Gaza which has been termed a 
measure of “collective punishment” by the United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil.11 As such, rather than being caught between burning religious hatreds and a 
need to appear to be what it is not, the opposite seems to be true with the AKP: it is 
9 “Playing with fire: Turkey will get burned”, Hürriyet Daily News, February 21st 2013 
(emphasis added), Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/playing- with- 
fire- turkey- will- get- burned.aspx?pageID=238&nid=41542. 
10 “Ties With Israel Continue Based on Mutual Interests - Turkish PM”, BBC Moni-
toring Europe, 16th February 2009, from Ertür,  C. “A Zionist in Disguise: Tur-
key’s Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Phony Anti- Israeli Rhetoric”, Global Research, 
November 30th 2012. 
11 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the international fact- finding mission 
to investigate violations of international law, including international humanitarian 
and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships car-
rying humanitarian assistance. (Human Rights Council: Fifteenth session, Septem-
ber 2010) p. 13.
Hüseyin Isksal and Ozan Örmeci - 978-3-653-96550-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 03/05/2019 10:45:14AM
via Bilkent Üniversitesi
142 Harriet Fildes
caught between pragmatic concerns, and a need to say what it cannot do regarding 
Israel. Criticism of Israel has been utilised strategically by the AKP, although not 
as extensively as in Arab countries, “for Turkish domestic political consumption.”12 
During the AKP’s first term, the level of economic, diplomatic and military coop-
eration between the two countries improved dramatically, negating the idea that 
an Islamic government’s religious identity precludes good relations with Israel. 
Thus, connecting these two dots (Islam being a priori anti- Israeli), in the linear 
fashion prevalent in Western political analysis seems ill- informed (not to mention 
ill- advised). This ideological straight jacket, which is employed selectively regard-
ing Muslim rather than secular Turkish leaders or Christian democrats abroad, 
and the level of political culturalism it entrenches is a highly detrimental fallacy 
and. As aforementioned, has the capacity to become a self- fulfilling prophesy as 
Western and Israeli policy- makers perceive actions to be a result of ideational ir-
rationality and respond accordingly.
The Aftermath: Operation Cast Lead
Israel and Turkey are two of the most militarised states in the developed world. 
They both rely on compulsory military service and had, until the new millennium, 
a highly securitised perspective of both internal and external actors. Thus, from 
the signing of the Joint Military Cooperation Agreement in 1996, Israel and Tur-
key enjoyed beneficial military cooperation, often used to demonstrate strength 
towards mutual enemies such as Syria. Since the Cold War onwards, Turkey and 
Israel have sustained a triad of military, intelligence and defence relations, and 
signed more mutual agreements under the AKP than any other government. How-
ever, from 2009 onwards, there has been a dramatic change of policy, best dem-
onstrated in October 2009, when Turkey barred Israel from participation in joint 
military exercises, apparently due to the recent Operation Cast Lead. This is one of 
the first clear examples of public opinion actively conditioning Turkey’s foreign- 
policy behaviour. There was intense debate and anger in Turkey’s public sphere 
over Israeli actions during the catastrophic Operation Cast Lead, and particular 
contestation over why and to what purpose the Israeli air force should be included 
in training exercises during the Anatolian Eagle air force drill. As Erdoğan stated; 
“I could not deny the request of my people, it was in this direction.”13 This is a clear 
example of public and state discourse finally catching up to policy formation, and 
one of the first examples of the AKP endorsing public statements and protests. 
Erdoğan stated on public television soon after this event that; “Turkey has never, in 
12 Landau, Jacob M. “Turkey’s Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan. State Identity and 
Security in the Middle East and Caucasus.” Middle Eastern Studies, 47.6, 2011, p. 137
13 Quoted in: Balci, A. and Kardaş, T. “The Changing Dynamics of Turkey’s Relations 
with Israel: An Analysis of ‘Securitization’”, Insight Turkey, Vol.  14, No.  2/2012, 
p. 116.
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its history, been on the side of persecutors, it has always defended the oppressed”14, 
highlighting the dialogic ideology behind such controversial decision- making. 
Almost immediately after Turkey’s display of dissatisfaction with Israel, Turkey 
joined in similar training activities with Syria, a sworn enemy of the Israel state 
with whom it has been at war since the 1967 war and Israel’s subsequent occupa-
tion of the Golan Heights in 1967. This was undoubtedly the lowest point thus far 
in Turkish- Israeli military cooperation, and also, a sign of things to come.
Nevertheless, this low point by no means marked the end of joint Turkish- 
Israeli military activities, with Erdoğan purportedly stating that; “Our relations 
with Israel continue based on mutual interests. Those who leave the table in fury 
return to it with losses. Some have suggested that we end Israeli training flights 
in Konya… Indeed, our General Staff also announced that relations with Israel will 
continue in accordance with Turkey’s interests. Military contracts and orders also 
remain in force. There are many agreements with Israel, old and new. These all re-
main in force. We have to be very careful in interstate relations.”15 Joint military ac-
tivities continued, including an Israeli- Turkey naval exercise in August 2009. Thus, 
the damage done here, regarding military partnerships at least, was minimal. Busi-
ness continued as usual. However, Operation Cast Lead sparked the recent spiral in 
diplomatic tensions between Israel and Turkey for a less transparent reason than 
the Turkish public spheres anger or Erdoğan’s condemnation; the crux of the issue 
was actually Turkish mediation efforts between Israel and Syria being thwarted 
and Israel’s failure to inform Turkey of the forthcoming Operation Cast Lead.
In the day’s preceding Cast Lead. Erdoğan had taken monumental steps to 
rekindle dialogue between Syria and Israel, holding multiple proximity talks in 
Ankara, during which Erdoğan believed some historic breakthroughs had been 
achieved. The final meeting with Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Olmert occurred just 
days before Cast Lead, with no mention of the forthcoming disaster. When the in-
cursion began, it was taken on a distinctly personal level, as an insult to Erdoğan’s 
negotiation efforts. According to Erdoğan, “This operation, launched despite all 
of these facts, is also disrespectful to Turkey.”16 Furthermore, following the elec-
tion of Netanyahu, Turkey was neither thanked, nor asked to restart its mediation 
14 “Turkey’s Action Towards Israel Worry US”, Jerusalem Post, October 17th 2009, 
Available at: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1255694828871&pagenam
e=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
15 “Ties With Israel Continue Based on Mutual Interests - Turkish PM”, BBC Moni-
toring Europe, 16th February 2009, from Ertür, C. “A Zionist in Disguise: Turkey’s 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Phony Anti- Israeli Rhetoric”, Global Research, November 
30th 2012. 
16 “Erdoğan angered by Israel’s Gaza campaign,” Today’s Zaman, December 29th 2008, 
Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news- 162602- erdogan- angered-by- israels- 
gaza- campaign.html. 
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efforts,17 in another blow to the Turkey’s self- understanding as a mediating power 
and trust in Israel.
Revealingly, Israeli and US discourse over Turkey’s increasing ties with Syria, 
oft cited as demonstrative of the AKP’s foreign- policy being dictated by Mus-
lim solidarity are undermined by two crucial issues. Firstly, the AKP’s early re-
lationship with Syria was aligned with both EU and U.S discourse and practice 
of “rapprochement” and Davutoğlu’s policy of “soft power”. Secondly, Erdoğan’s 
behaviour since the start of the crisis in Syria in 2011 has been fully on side with 
NATO and the EU, taking a more active role in preventing the expansion of the 
threat, something which has the potential to put Israel’s existence in jeopardy. In 
fact, given the mutual threat to Israel and Turkey posed by both the current crisis 
and also the disturbing nature of many of the organisations who would be part of a 
post- Assad regime, it was remarkably short sighted on both Erdoğan’s and Netan-
yahu’s behalf that they failed to re- establish direct dialogue regarding this matter 
until the use of chemical weapons in Syria and increasing fear of regional spillover 
from this conflict changed the game. Amongst the other aforementioned factors, 
the Turkish- Israeli breakdown can also be attributed to Erdoğan’s outright support 
for the Arab Spring in general, which was disturbing to Jerusalem. Although Syria 
and Israel have technically been at war since 1967, the status quo in Syria was by 
no means as threatening to Israel as the current political turmoil which has seen 
the first conflict in the Golan Heights for nearly 40 years. The regional shift in bal-
ance of power, disruption of the status quo antagonists and the emergence of new 
actors in Syria and Egypt, many of whom are from populist Islamist movements is 
far more dangerous to Israel. Consequently, Turkey’s ongoing support, both rhe-
torically and with weapons and shelter, to the Syrian rebels is undermining Israel’s 
stability in the region. However, a mutual interest in supporting the moderate 
Sunni rebels as opposed to the extremist militia also operating in the region can be 
seen as one of the primary motivation for the recent stabilisation of Turkish- Israeli 
relations. The changing political environment of Turkey and Israel may impel the 
full re- establishment of relations, due to their common interest in stabilising the 
region and particularly Syria, interestingly, the reason the Turkish- Israeli strategic 
partnership was established in the golden age
It is fairly well acknowledged now in post- positivist social- science that politics 
often takes place at a much subtler level than diplomatic talks and foreign- policy 
narratives. The political significance of popular culture is the most obvious exam-
ple of “semiotic practices”.18 This refers to a process of meaning production through 
the use of language ad culture as “systems of signification.”19 When a culturally and 
17 Inbar,  E. “Israeli- Turkish Tensions and their International Ramifications”, Orbis 
55.1, 2011, p. 134.
18 Wedeen, Lisa. “Conceptualizing culture: Possibilities for political science”, Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 96.4, 2002, p. 713.
19 Ibid, p. 714.
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politically significant narrative emerges through bottom up rather than top down 
processes to become a national discourse, it are far more threatening due to the 
natural, and thus more entrenched nature of the opinion, and the decreased abil-
ity of the state to control subversive narratives. Such an event occurred between 
Turkey and Israel as a result of a popular Turkish TV series, “Ayrılık” (Farewell), 
which depicted IDF soldiers killing Palestinian children during Operation Cast 
Lead. This is now a popular narrative in Turkey, regarding the Israeli government’s 
activities in Gaza and has a definitive impact on public opinion. The subsequent 
humiliation felt by Israel and inability to deal with this through normal diplomatic 
channels or through using a “hearts and minds” strategy led Israel to utilise its 
own semiotic practices to undermine to legitimacy of Turkish opinion on this mat-
ter. Turkey’s ambassador to Israel, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, was called to meet with 
Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, to discuss complaints regarding 
this show, which notably was aired by Turkey’s public channel, Turkish Radio and 
Television. The presence of only the Israel flag (a break with normal diplomatic 
procedure) and the purposeful seating of the ambassador in a lower chair, a move 
which Ayalon drew the Israeli presses attention to, indicates that Ayalon set out to 
deliberately humiliate the ambassador, and by extension, the Turkish public. This 
move united the public, the AKP and even the CHP in resounding criticism, which 
in an important and almost unprecedented turn, actually impelled an apology from 
the Israeli government.
These contentious moves, the original humiliation and subsequent apology, can 
be said to have been motivated by public opinion and economic concerns respec-
tively. Right wing and nationalist Israelis were outraged after the airing of the TV 
series, and Ayalon, as a member of the Yisrael Beitenu party, believed his actions 
would endear him to public opinion. However, once Ankara threatened the seces-
sion of diplomatic and thus, rhetorically at least, economic relations as a reaction, 
Ayalon was pressured by the powers that be, namely Ehud Olmert, to issue this 
statement; “I had no intention to humiliate you personally and apologize for the 
way the démarche was handled and perceived… Please convey this to the Turk-
ish people for whom we have great respect.”20 Time magazine wrote of this; “the 
strategic ties are driven by mutual national interests that trump internal politics.” 
However, such artificial extraction of internal politics from national interest is a 
fallacy. Turkey’s national interest in this case was to derive an apology which 
would placate the public sphere, a necessity in order to continue military, diplo-
matic and economic relations with Israel openly, something they can no longer do 
for precisely this reason. Thus, internal politics were not trumped by national in-
terest, or vice versa, as they are mutually constitutive porous entities. The ongoing 
reduction of the public sphere, and more specifically, the role of public opinion in 
20 Klein, A, “Israel and Turkey: Anatomy of a Dissing War” Time Magazine, January 
14th 2010, Available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1953746,00.
html. 
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limiting the possible actions of a state perpetuates the absence of holistic analysis 
regarding Turkey’s foreign- policy behaviour, as such behaviour is entirely interde-
pendent with societal, historical and ideational variables.
The incident at Davos, otherwise known as the “one minute” crisis, in which 
Erdoğan walked off stage during the World Economic Forum as a response to a 
perceived injustice from the moderator and angry rhetoric from Israeli President, 
Shimon Peres, gave a huge boost to the ideological legitimacy of Erdoğan. Both the 
rhetoric he used and his decision to walk off stage must be subject to interrogation 
as they are very revealing about the relationship between public opinion and state 
discourse in Turkey. Although Erdoğan undoubtedly takes a personal approach 
to the plight of the Palestinians, the overtly emotional language employed during 
this speech is resonant of propaganda. For example, although perhaps warranted, 
particularly in the eyes of the Turkish public, Erdoğan’s statement to Peres that; 
“you are older than I am. But the volume of your voice is too high. And I know this 
is because of the guilt psychology… When it is time to kill, you know how to kill 
well. I know well how you kill children on beaches, how you shoot them”21, stands 
in sharp contrast to the diplomatic language usually employed by state leaders, 
even during such politically turbulent times. As such, the aim of Erdoğan’s emotive 
language would seem to be mobilisation of the Turkish public. But to what ends 
given Turkey’s previously discussed reliance on Israel for military and energy rela-
tions? This example of Turkey appearing to stand up in the face of Israeli impunity, 
and the subsequent emergence of this as a discursive norm in Turkey, is aimed 
at demonstrating to the people that democracy is effective and that the govern-
ment is responsive. The approval rating of this event speaks volumes, with 81.7% 
supporting Erdoğan’s remarks, and only 10.2 disapproving and a further 78.3% 
approving of the walkout.22 By voicing public sentiments during such a high level 
meeting, Erdoğan boosted his democratic and ideological legitimacy, both at home 
and abroad. Furthermore, with local elections shortly following this demonstration 
in March 2009, a more cynical motivation can be highlighted; that of political ma-
noeuvring and voter manipulation. Between January the 26th and the 30th, after 
Davos, Erdoğan’s approval rating sky- rocketed from 55% to 74%.23
Similarly, Peres’s demonstration after the incident seemed entirely conditioned 
by personal and state machismo and a need to salvage Israeli public opinion in 
his favour with elections forthcoming. In fact, Erdoğan pointed to this in an in-
terview with the New York Times, directly after Davos, in which he made a much 
more forceful, nuanced and pragmatic argument for a cessation of violence and 
21 World- January29- Switzerland- Davos- Peres, Reuters, January 29th 2009, Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/29/world- jan29- switzerland-davos-peres- 
erdo- idUS812520090129. 
22 “Davos Crisis”, Metropoll - Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar, January 2009, Available 
at: http://www.metropoll.com.tr/report/davos- crisis. 
23 Ibid.
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accountability; “We have a serious relationship. But the current Israeli government 
should check itself. They should not exploit this issue for the upcoming elections 
in Israel.”24 In a Turkish transcript of a phone- call between Peres and Erdoğan it 
was written that Peres apologised for his actions during Davos. Subsequently, the 
Israeli government issued a statement asserting that the words “I’m sorry” were 
never said by Peres.25 Knowing whose account of events is true in this matter is 
both impossible and irrelevant. This became both a personal and a national matter 
of pride for the two leaders and consequently, concessions, apologies and mean-
ingful dialogue were pushed to the side, replaced by egoism and competition.
The Aftermath: Mavi Marmara
The events which occurred on this fateful day are still held up to much contesta-
tion. As such, this chapter will focus not on attributing blame but rather reflect on 
the aftermath, and the effect this has had on Turkish- Israeli relations. Similar to the 
Davos incident, the game of blame attribution become irrelevant at a point, as the 
state discourse, whether truthful or not, become assimilated into a social/national 
narrative of events, preventing, until very recently, concessions on both sides due 
to national dignity and pride. By analysing the immediate reactions to the Mavi 
Marmara incident, attention is drawn to the polarity of Turkish and Israeli event 
interpretation and cognitive processing.26 These, when combined with opposing 
organisational frameworks within each country, contrasting institutional norms 
and strong societal, media and military actors, produce an entirely different narra-
tive and thus, policy regarding the shared events in question. The actors involved, 
explicitly, the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) were mobilised and opera-
tionalised due to a variety of political opportunities, notably, the recent Operation 
Cast Lead, critical Turkish, and notably, international condemnation of Operation 
Cast Lead and subsequent questioning of the legitimacy of the Gaza blockade, and 
furthermore, the rise of transnational human rights activism, resource sharing and 
alliances in the new millennium. It is interesting, and unprecedented, that a hu-
man rights based movement should have such a dramatic and detrimental effect on 
bilateral relations in Turkey. I will discuss briefly the specific political opportunity 
which allowed for this event to arise, based on Tarrow’s original model.27 Firstly, 
the state had indicated it was open to societal contestation regarding Israel in the 
24 “Palestine today is an open- air prison”, The Washington Post, January 1st 2009, 
Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/01/30/
AR2009013002809_3.html. 
25 Barak R, “Is this the transcript of Peres’ call to Erdoğan following the Davos spat?”, 
Haaretz, January 1st 2009, Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/is- this- the- 
transcript- of- peres- call- to- erdogan- following- davos- spat- 1.267121. 
26 Taber, Charles S., op cit. p. 32.
27 Tarrow, Sidney  G. (1988), Power in Movement, New  York: Cambridge University 
Pres, pp. 76- 80.
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International Fluctuations and Domestic 
Limitations: Turkish- Israeli Relations in the 
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Abstract: Turkey was the first Muslim state to recognize Israel in 1949 and since 
this time, military and economic bilateral relations have grown exponentially, par-
ticularly since the election of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in 2002. This evidence 
is indicative that, contrary to popular opinion, the AKP’s purportedly Islamic iden-
tity did not stand in the way of creating ties with Israel based on geo- strategic, 
economic and security realities. Although this remains the case in Turkey, as a 
democracy, the government is not immune to changes in public opinion and thus 
has developed a populist discourse on this matter. Consequently, Operation Cast 
Lead, Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident have left Turkish- Israeli diplomatic 
and political relations frozen and caused a key divergence from Turkey’s “zero- 
problems” policy in the region. Yet despite emphatic language, the divide between 
practice and discourse when it comes to Turkey’s ‘hard’ stance towards Israel is 
stark. Although vocally critical of Israel’s policies in Palestine, trade relations have 
remained immune to diplomatic difficulties and continue to increase under the 
AKP’s jurisdiction. Consequently, this chapter will examine the disjuncture be-
tween the continuously strong trading and economic relations between Israel and 
Turkey in the light of the diplomatic ice age, examining the domestic and inter-
national factors which dictate said relations. In order to provide a comprehensive 
examination of both discursive and practical transformations in Turkish Foreign 
Policy behaviour and the political economy of the AKP, the function and effect 
of domestic ideational, historical and cultural variables must be examined. Such 
variables dictate the complex political opportunity structure in which the AKP 
operates, and consequently, define the future relations of these two important re-
gional powers. Analysis of such contentious issues is increasingly important for 
understanding Turkey’s decision- making processes. Turkey’s future role as a re-
gional power, as well as their EU accession bid is predicated on the normalization 
of Turkish- Israeli relations. Not only do Turkish- Israeli relations speak volumes 
about the nature and purpose of the AKP’s power, but also implicitly define their 
limitations as a dominant actor in the international system.
Keywords: Justice and Development Party, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkey- Israeli 
Relations.
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Changes in foreign policy formation under the AKP have come under heavy scru-
tiny, particularly since the commencement of their second term in 2007 and the 
arguable demise of Davutoğlu’s “zero- problems with neighbours” policy. Increas-
ing economic and diplomatic relations with contentious countries such as Iran and 
pre- revolutionary Syria are supposedly reflective of a shift in Turkey’s orientation 
from Western to Eastern facing. Equally, deteriorating diplomatic relations with Is-
rael are often cited as demonstrative of this shift in axis regarding Turkey’s foreign 
policy formation in the Davutoğlu era. Such reductionist and de- contextualised 
conclusions are generally based on the reflexive idea that an “Islamist” political 
party in Turkey will eschew Turkey’s European identity and Western alliances to 
re- kindle neo- Ottoman hegemony in the Middle East, utilising the Israeli issue as 
its flag- ship upon which to consolidate pan- Islamic values. Although having lost 
most of its credibility within academic circles due to empirical incoherence since 
the election of the AKP, arguments regarding Turkey’s shifting axis are still per-
vasive within the international policy- making community, with such Orientalist 
ideas visibly and palpably influencing policy and discourse on this matter which 
in turn, impacts upon the possible policy options and constraints facing the AKP. 
As such, this political rationale is at risk of becoming a self- fulfilling prophesy or 
set of prescriptive axioms.
The main thesis of this chapter is that the current stagnation in Turkish- Israeli 
political relations is due to to the democratisation of Turkey and the subsequent 
emergence of public opinion as a palpable factor in foreign policy formation. 
Moreover, as multiple interest groups emerge from Turkey’s recently established 
public sphere, the actions of the state are increasingly subject to alternative con-
testation. This multitude of actors and alternative contestations sometimes leads to 
contradictory or seemingly schizophrenic policy- making. The democratic nature 
of both Turkey and Israel means that public opinion is an important parameter, 
defining and constraining policy options and the opportunity for concessions on 
both sides which has entrenched the recent freeze in diplomatic relations. Simi-
larly, the growth of economic relations is motivated by domestic variables, and the 
continual attempts to fulfil the idealised, yet perhaps necessary goal of military, 
diplomatic and strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel.
To understand Turkish- Israeli political relations in contrast with economic ties, 
this chapter will map and asses three crucial events since the election of the AKP; 
Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Davos in 2009 and, the Mavi Marmara incident in 
2010. This will be tied into an analysis of discourse, practice and economic fluctua-
tions during this time period in order to identify the AKP’s foreign policy priorities 
and limitations. Moreover, this analysis will eschew the traditional dichotomies 
used regarding Turkey’s foreign- policy of “East” versus “West”, “secular” versus 
“Islamist” to take a more nuanced and holistic approach towards the asserted 
causality between public opinion, economic necessities and foreign policy forma-
tion in Turkey. Although Turkey’s hybrid identity of both Muslim and secular is 
Hüseyin Isksal and Ozan Örmeci - 978-3-653-96550-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 03/05/2019 10:45:14AM
via Bilkent Üniversitesi
 Turkish- Israeli Relations in the New Millennium 133
undoubtedly a factor, such static characterisations do little for developing an in- 
depth understanding of Turkey’s “political opportunity structure”1, and moreover, 
are more often taken for granted than examined.
The existing approaches are too ahistorical and acontextual, overlooking the 
coexistence of thriving trade with political confrontation between Turkey and Is-
rael. This paper will investigate the logic and decision- making behind this per-
ceived dichotomy by examining closely the evolution of Turkish- Israeli relations 
from 2000 to 2012. In doing so, it will reveal that this bifurcation of relations is 
by no means contradictory but can be comprehended by using the “political op-
portunity structure.” The use of the political opportunity structure for analysing 
Turkish foreign- policy is pertinent for a number of reasons. Firstly, the opening of 
the traditionally top- down Turkish state caused by economic liberalisation from 
the 1990s onwards allowed for increased “input” from social forces and non- state 
actors. Secondly, domestic and international changes to the political environment 
and state institutions between the 1990s and the 2000s, particularly EU accession, 
civilianisation of Turkey’s decision- making process and a deteriorating peace- 
process, had a deep impact on the characteristics and goals of social movements 
and the state. Thirdly, increased economic performance in the new millennium 
saw the rising effectiveness of Turkish foreign- policy, and with it, a growing ca-
pacity of society to influence the decision- making process. However, the growing 
coordination between domestic social movements and state decision- making can-
not be extracted from its international context. As such, I will synthesise my analy-
sis of the domestic political opportunity structure with an assessment of the wider 
structural, systemic and environmental forces at work. As such, the chapter will 
utilise public opinion data as well as post- positivist, broadly social constructivist 
analysis which privileges so- called “low politics” as constitutive of decisions made 
at state level. The aim is to put forth a deeper analysis of Turkish- Israeli relations 
than can be accounted for in traditional realist- based, positivist research which 
continues to dominate in Western political and social science. Such an analysis 
eschews the traditional focus on systemic forces and material realities as the only 
variables motivating foreign policy decisions, although they are incorporated into 
the analysis in the latter section.
The reason for employing post- positivist research over traditional approaches 
to Turkish foreign- policy such as structural realism is due to the identified rela-
tionship between public opinion and foreign- policy discourse and practice in the 
AKP era. One of the core impacts of which is that economic ties between Tur-
key and Israel which contrast with state rhetoric are often played down or even 
hidden. The crux of this contention is based on this chapters examination of the 
stark dichotomy between Turkish- Israeli political deterioration and their blossom-
ing economic relations, yet also on the consideration that the mentality behind 
1 For details of this theory see; Tarrow, Sidney G. (2011) Power in Movement: Social 
Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press.
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both is to establish Turkey as a regional hegemon. Such an assessment is key to 
determining Turkey’s future prospects as the vehement rhetoric abounding from 
the AKP regarding Israel is actually the core issue preventing this occurrence. Tur-
key’s recent exclusion and alienation from crucial Israeli- Palestinian peace- talks 
being exemplary of this contestation. Concurrently, with Turkish- Israeli relations 
suffering such dramatic fluctuations, it is difficult to understand the difference be-
tween reality and rhetoric, as such this chapter will examine discourse in contrast 
and convergence with practices, to determine the role of both leaders and public 
perceptions of the self and the Other, which are filtered through social narratives 
and historical memory,2 thereby playing an important role in the decision making 
process.
Erdoğan and Netanyahu are enigmatic leaders who at once command, but are 
also subject to, public opinion. It will be argued that their original perceptions of 
each other, and subsequent framing of events, entrenched the current antagonistic 
opinion within their societies, and this continued outside of their control to dictate 
the policy options available to both parties. Such an analysis is important, both due 
to how leaders discourse on the Other has been assimilated into society, and also, 
due to societies’ framing of events using moral rather than legal or political terms, 
as will be shown regarding Mavi Marmara. Such an analysis of image and belief 
systems of cognitive knowledge will highlight both the bottom up and top down 
aspects of foreign- policy formation, not only in an attempt to reveal the complex 
ideational, cultural and social variables influencing the decision- making process, 
but also to highlight where room for reconciliation lies; at societal rather than 
state level. Thus, four main concepts will be put across as the determinants of the 
fluctuations and limitations on Turkish- Israeli relations; narratives, frames, actor- 
understanding and public contestation, which interplay with regional and global 
dynamics to dictate the complex decision- making process of the AKP.
The End of the Golden Age
The convergences of Turkish and Israeli political identities and goals in the 1990s 
can be attributed to a few main factors which I will discuss, before going on to 
highlight the much more contentious and politically relevant divergences of the 
new millennium. In the 1990s, both Turkey and Israel perceived themselves as 
democratic outsiders in the region. They believed themselves to have mutual stra-
tegic interests in developing good economic, diplomatic and particularly military 
partnerships. Similarly, they have two of the most powerful military’s in West 
Asia, due to their domestic and regional threat perception, particularly regarding 
the issue of Syria, funding and sheltering the PKK and posing a strategic threat to 
Israel due to an ongoing state of war between the two countries. This perceived 
2 Taber, Charles S. (1998) “The interpretation of foreign policy events: A cognitive 
process theory”, in Sylvan and Voss (eds.) Problem Representation, pp. 29- 52.
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threat led to a limited amount of intelligence sharing during the so- called golden 
age of the mid to late 1990s. In the post Cold War global context of regional threat- 
perception and domestic securitisation which took place both in Turkey and in 
Israel, such cooperation was logical and also, domestically acceptable due to its 
emergence in tandem with a seemingly viable peace- process between Israel and 
Palestine. Yet the alliance formed from such mutual interests failed to take into 
account the impact of the changing political environment regarding threat per-
ception of key states such as Syria, Iraq and Iran. By linking cooperation with 
Israel so intimately to this securitised world view, once perception of what consti-
tutes a threat to Turkey changed, relations with Israel were bound to deteriorate. 
Compounded by the rise of civil- society actors, increased media freedoms and a 
change in the balance of civil- military relations, the new millennium brought forth 
a changing political opportunity structure for the successive Turkish government; 
the AKP. This de- securitised perception no longer believed that Turkey was “sur-
rounded on all sides by trouble.” or that “It is critical for [Turkey] to jump outside 
this circle of chaos and find friends in the region [and that] Israel was the perfect 
choice”.3 This meant that a strategic partnership with Israel became less imperative 
and more of a burden; the reason being the aforementioned emergence of public 
opinion as a defining constraint on state behaviour in Turkey.
International and domestic optimism regarding the progress made in the peace- 
process in the 1990s gave an element of social legitimacy to increasing relations 
with Israel in Turkey. However, this came to a decisive end with the start of the 
new millennium. In the early 2000s, the rise of Ariel Sharon’s administration, the 
death of the Oslo Peace Accords, and subsequent bloodshed of the Al- Aqsa Inti-
fada, combined with the 2006 occupation of Southern Lebanon, brought forth col-
lective historical memory of the Sabra and Shatila massacre, engendering growing 
anti- Israeli public opinion and a critical state discourse which would become the 
norm in Turkey. The development of more press freedoms encouraged and often 
entrenched such public consternation as successive Israeli actions in Gaza were 
televised and disseminated to the public, an act which simultaneously put pres-
sure on the government to behave in accordance with public sentiments. The vast 
civilian casualties suffered by the Palestinians in Jenin refugee camp in 2002 was 
received in Turkey with outrage, making relations with Israel more difficult to 
justify domestically. The subsequent controversial statement by the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Bülent Ecevit, which described these events as “genocide” may have done 
much for his domestic standing, but it also revealed to Israel the stark divide in 
threat perception, actor understanding and contrasting lenses through which the 
conflict was viewed in the two countries. Beliefs that profuse apologies on the 
Turkish side could have been enough to bridge this divide were quickly put an 
end to with the start of the Iraq war following shortly after, and the election of the 
3 Balci, A. and Kardaş, T. (2012) “The Changing Dynamics of Turkey’s Relations with 
Israel: An Analysis of ‘Securitization’”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 105.
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“Islamist” AKP. Both these developments brought about another major diversion 
from the “golden age” of strategic partnership and increased Othering, misunder-
standings and rivalries.
The Iraq war was perhaps the first example of polarisation in Israeli and Turk-
ish public opinion/policy formation. The Turkish public sphere was strongly 
against the war, in contrast with its Israeli counterpart. In 2003, the AKP was faced 
with the first international test of its leadership, identity and allegiance. The U.S 
requested permission for their military personnel to use Turkey as a base from 
which to attack Iraq. Arguments advocated by a number of U.S scholars suggest 
that Turkey made the decision not to allow U.S personnel in was based on concepts 
of Muslim Brotherhood, yet this argument does not hold up. Chomsky argues this 
point to the extreme, highlighting that the democratic and consultative process in 
Turkey far outstripped the American façade as the AKP was responding to public 
opinion, which notably stood at 95% against the U.S using Turkey as a base,4 with 
as many against the war in general.
If Israel believed Turkish policy regarding to Iraq was threatening, exactly the 
same could be said for Turkey. Israel’s support for the establishment of an in-
dependent Kurdish state, fracturing Iraq, was perceived as a highly threatening 
move to the integrity of the Turkish state. It was also a barely disguised move to 
keep Iraq, previously the leader of pan- Arabism, one of the most ideologically and 
physically threatening movements to Israel, divided, and thus weak. Given the 
rise of cross- border PKK attacks during the Iraq war, it is unsurprising that such 
support for an independent Kurdistan was not well received in Ankara. The subse-
quent derailment of the Turkish- Israeli strategic partnership stemmed from these 
events. Having previously believed Turkey to be on the same side, Israel correctly 
took these first, and key, divergences in interests and approaches to West Asian 
security as a sign of things to come. The previous, and arguably short sighted 
and optimistic focus on the points where Turkish and Israeli policy converged 
was superseded by an era in which previously ignored divergences dominated the 
 political discourse.
Turkey and Israel’s perceptions and methodologies regarding the maintenance 
of regional stability, the meaning of alternate actors’ behaviour and their concepts 
of threat- perception and alliance formation are based on cultural, geopolitical 
and strategic “realities”, and thus have all been subject to dramatic changes in the 
new millennium. Due to a series of misperceptions, erroneous judgements and 
misevaluations of the political opportunity structure in which actors must each 
develop their individual foreign- policy, coping mechanisms and mutual strategic 
interests have seemingly dissolved. This is particularly applicable in Turkey, where 
desecurisation and civilianisation led the decline of military power, dramatically 
4 Bell, A., “Interview with Noam Chomsky”, Hobo Magazine, October 6th, 2003, Avail-
able at: http://hobomagazine.com/post/26564542102/allen- bell- dr- chomsky-id-like- 
to- begin- this. 
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altering the organisational framework of the decision- making process. As such, 
the organisational actors have changed, particularly due to the entrance of society 
into policy formation, and also, the emergence of the “Islamist elite”, which as an 
ideational Other to the Israeli government, altered their perception and rhetoric 
towards Turkey, and subsequently their policy too.
The Multi- Dimensional Foreign Policy
The new millennium brought forth a new activism in Turkish foreign- policy; 
Davutoğlu’s multi- dimensional, “zero problems with neighbours”. The subsequent 
failure of this approach to maintain good ties with all of Turkey’s Western and 
Eastern neighbours is often held up as an example of Turkey moving towards the 
East, or the equally over- used cliché, “turning its back to the West”. However, this 
chapter argues that the original impetus for this foreign- policy was in line with EU 
and NATO interests- to promote regional peace and security. Moreover, its failure 
has been exaggerated, although, by nature, this policy was flawed from the start. 
Maintaining good diplomatic relations with neighbours as contrasting as Iran and 
Israel is demonstratively impossible, an issue which Anat Lapidot- Firilla succinctly 
brought attention to by describing “zero problems” as “the impossible mathemati-
cal equation.”5
Although accurate to an extent, Lapidot- Firilla’s understanding of Turkish 
foreign- policy as reflective of naïveté and lack of experience is too scathing and 
ignores the complexities of the decision- making process in Turkey, as an emerging 
economic player accountable to pubic opinion. As such, its economic aims includ-
ed diversification of its export markets due to the gap left by Europe’s recession. 
This chapter promotes an alternative understanding of the AKP’s decision- making 
process as one driven by a combination of public interest, material necessities and 
a dose of wishful thinking regarding normative moral statements aimed at Israel’s 
treatment of Palestinians. This position undermines Lapidot- Firilla’s elegantly 
phrased, if unsubstantiated assertion that “Turkish policy makers have adopted an 
outlook that sacrifices interests on the altar of absolute and universal morality”.6
Turkey’s “zero problems” policy stems from its very difference perception of 
regional security issues and resolution methods than the one employed by Israel. 
Turkey is highly dependent on maintaining relations with contentious countries 
such as Sudan, Lebanon and particularly Iran, for much needed energy resources. 
Despite intense efforts to diversify due to pressure from U.S sanctions, Iranian im-
ports currently stand at 20% of Turkey’s total natural gas consumption, a number 
increasing every year, with Iran providing a further 51% of Turkey’s crude oil re-
sources. Turkey’s dialogue and diplomacy efforts with countries such as Syria and 
5 Lapidot- Firilla, A. (2010) “Turkey: From State to Faith- Based NGO”, The Van Leer 
Jerusalem Institute.
6 Lapidot- Firilla, op cit.
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Iran, and indeed attempts at conflict resolution between Israel, Syria and Hamas, 
represent the AKP’s wish to establish Turkey as regional interlocutor but also its 
economic and security requirements. Furthermore, Turkey’s perception of stability 
certainly includes Israel, which is also reflective of their interdependence regard-
ing military cooperation and technological assistance, combating mutual terror 
threats, business and tourism partnerships, and energy and economic needs, which 
will be discussed later, in the final section of this chapter. However, Turkey also 
understands the Israeli- Palestinian conflict as one of the core obstacles to peace in 
West Asia, and as such, these strategic partnerships are being superseded by a era 
dominated by politicised and economically based decision making rather than the 
securitised cooperation of the “golden era.”
Turkey’s support of Iran’s supposedly benign nuclear programme stems at 
least partially from its perception of Israel. Given Israel almost certainly possesses 
nuclear weapons, condemning Iran for enriching uranium for energy purposes 
seems hypocritical and counter- intuitive to Turkey. Similarly, Israel’s perception 
of Turkey’s relationship with Iran as precluding relations with Israel, due to Iran’s 
constant denial of Israel’s right to exist and provocative discourse to match, can 
be seen as one of the main triggers of deteriorating diplomatic ties. Turkey and 
Brazil’s efforts in May 2009 to broker a deal in which half of Iran’s enriched ura-
nium could be exchanged for a Turkish medical research reactor and their mutual 
vote against increasing sanctions on Iran was interpreted within Israel as both a 
dangerous unilateral decision and as an example of Turkey’s purported axis shift. 
However, this issue should be read as exemplary of Turkey attempting to establish 
itself as a core regional mediator, as despite eschewing Western policy regarding 
the nuclear issue, they have been key in the negotiations with Iran.
As with the Iran nuclear issue, Israel perceives Ankara’s “friendly” relations with 
Hamas as a highly threatening development. However, Ankara’s relations with 
Hamas are actually quite limited, possibly due to the lack of enthusiasm within 
the Turkish public sphere for this organisation.7 The AKP’s tepid support is pretty 
much constrained to the world of rhetoric and Turkey certainly does not support 
them in any dangerous material sense such as through the provision of arms. Once 
again, the rupture in Turkey- Israeli relations caused by Ankara’s relationship with 
Hamas is both exaggerated and a matter of Turkish public opinion. The Turkish 
population is highly reactive to developments in Gaza and the AKP, unlike Israel 
and most of the Western world, believe Hamas to be a legitimately elected (al-
though certainly not desirable) government. As such, the policy of negotiating with 
Hamas directly is entirely pragmatic. Turkey has pushed for further involvement of 
Hamas in peace- talks, something Israel has unequivocally rejected.
Yet Turkey’s understanding of the compelling reasons to negotiate with Hamas 
is no longer confined to “Islamist” governments, who are presumed sympathisers. 
7 Pew Research Center, 2012 Survey Data, Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/da
tabase/?indicator=35&country=224. 
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This opinion is beginning to reach mainstream academic and policy analysis, as 
well as a variety of EU countries. Rather than viewing Turkey’s mediation efforts 
as a negative development based on an Islamist ideology, they can instead be 
seen as an attempt by Turkey to continue its negotiating tactics with the aim of 
regional security. According to an interview with the International Crisis Group, 
a senior AKP official discussed the pragmatic motivations for facilitating dialogue 
with Hamas when Khaled Mashal visited Turkey in 2006, stating that; “To the ex-
tent we have influence over Hamas, we use it for positive purposes. When Khaled 
Mashal came to Ankara, we told him, ‘now you’ve won an election, make the best 
of it, integrate; you’re not just a resistance group any more; work within the sys-
tem’. Hamas was ready for this but then came the [Western] policies of isolation 
[against Hamas] and the whole thing failed.” The AKP apparently used this time 
in order to convince Mashal both of Israel’s right to exist, and also of the benefits 
of pursuing dialogue as a means to conflict resolution. Such an example of the 
positive effects of Turkish mediation and the possibilities it opens up for future 
relations with both Hamas and Israel was also seen in 2011, when Turkey directly 
participated in brokering the deal with Hamas which finally ensured the release 
of captured Israeli soldier, Gilat Shalit, in exchange for over a thousand Palestin-
ian prisoners of Israel, a portion of whom Turkey took in. Furthermore, despite 
Israel’s criticism of Ankara- Hamas relations, this certainly cannot be viewed as 
one of the main factors leading to the deterioration of Turkish- Israeli relations, 
as that particular landslide did not really begin until, 2008 when Operation Cast 
Lead was initiated. The Turkish criticism which arose from this was not linked to 
Hamas’s legitimacy or democratic credibility, but rather to the suffering of Pal-
estinian civilians, which is assimilated into Turkish societies culture and history 
as an important national cause, and thus, was reflected in state discourse, in both 
secular and Islamic narratives. Nevertheless, this unilateral act aimed at endow-
ing Hamas with a modicum of international legitimacy was very badly received 
in Israel, as both of symbol of the AKP’s purportedly Islamic identity and as a 
decisive move away from coordinated decision making with the U.S and the EU; 
a sign of Turkey’s axis shift.
The contrasting view taken here is that Turkish- Israeli relations were never on 
the stable ground they were perceived to be, thereby undermining the conceptu-
alisation that the purportedly Islamist identity of the AKP is the primary, or even 
a minor motivation in the secession of diplomatic ties or are part of a broader 
shifting axis. The relationship was never one based on trust, ideational alignment 
or mutually enforced defence, rather is was a relationship of convenience. Thus, 
when public opinion hardened towards Israel, the lack of popular support for con-
tinued diplomatic ties led to their effective dissolution. Yet both countries continue 
to expand their economic relations at an ever increasing rate, seemingly defying 
norms of economic interdependence necessitating a level of political cooperation. 
Notably, Turkish- Israeli trade relations peaked in 2008 and again in 2010, coincid-
ing with Operation Cast Lead and the Mavi Marmara incident respectively. Both 
these events initiated times of intense political instability between and within the 
Hüseyin Isksal and Ozan Örmeci - 978-3-653-96550-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 03/05/2019 10:45:14AM
via Bilkent Üniversitesi
140 Harriet Fildes
two countries, yet economic relations continued their growth, immune to politi-
cal strife, an anomaly which will be discussed at length in the final section of this 
chapter.
Thus, both the implementation and effect of Davutoğlu’s multi- dimensional 
foreign- policy can be said to be orientated towards economic development and 
regional stability, and not aimed exclusively at any country, particularly not only 
Turkey’s “Muslim brothers”. More accurate is that, as an effect of economic liber-
alisation from the 1990s onwards, the emergence of a strong and internationalised 
private sector and a rapidly expanding population, Ankara pushed its bounda-
ries of foreign relations further than any previous administration in an attempt 
to diversify and expand trading opportunities. The development of a strong West 
Asian component of Turkish Foreign Policy emerged as part of Davutoğlu’s three- 
pronged approach of “strategic depth” which “rests on its geographical and histori-
cal depth.”8 This approach reveals both the mentality and the pragmatism behind 
Turkey’s rekindling of Eastern relations and subsequent complex interdependence 
with contentious countries. This links to the role of perception in foreign- policy 
formation. The much espoused clichés about an Islamist government in Turkey 
leading the country back to the East were assimilated into Israeli foreign- policy, 
but really consolidated under Netanyahu when he was re- elected in 2009. The 
Israeli government perceived changes, such as Turkey’s increasing relations with 
Iran, as demonstrative of this shifting axis proposition, and consequently, like a 
spurned lover, increased the confrontational rhetoric.
Nevertheless, there has been a palpable re- orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy 
and economic cooperation Eastwards which requires analysis. With the EU in fi-
nancial meltdown and Turkey’s disillusioned populace unwilling to go down with 
it, it would appear natural that Turkey should turn to its Eastern neighbours to 
solidify economic and political relations and take up a more active global economic 
role. Its doing so does not implicitly entail the end of Turkish- Israeli relations, de-
spite having long created ruptures between Turkey and its Arab counterparts, nor 
is Turkey’s new active economic policy a major variable defining these countries 
recent interaction. Instead, Turkish- Israeli relations, or lack thereof, are demon-
strative of a different transformation in foreign policy formation, not based on 
an ideational Eastern orientation but rather on Turkish public opinion, increas-
ing self- confidence regarding Davutoğlu’s assertive foreign- policy and economic 
necessities. Moreover, the shift in economic relations eastwards actually encom-
passes Israel, as one of Turkey’s main export markets outside of the EU. Notably, 
such practices come into direct conflict with Turkey’s rhetoric, and as such, are not 
readily disseminated to the public.
8 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Interview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu”, Published in 
AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on 12 March 2012, Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.
tr/interview- by- mr_- ahmet- davuto%C4%9Flu- published- in- auc- cairo- review- _
egypt_- on- 12- march- 2012.en.mfa.
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Religious identity plays almost no part in the AKP’s foreign policy decision- 
making process, when compared to much more compelling factors such as public 
opinion, societal identities and event perception. Such assertions clash not only 
with mainstream Western discourse on Turkey’s foreign- policy behaviour but also 
with secularist narratives inside Turkey. In fact, Hürriyet Daily News’ contention 
that “the Islamist Erdoğan government… is clearly caught between burning hatreds 
– based on its religious ideology and seen most visibly in the case of Israel and Syr-
ian President Bashar al- Assad’s regime – and the need to appear to be what it is 
not.”9 is highly demonstrative of one part of the popular narrative on the AKP’s 
foreign- policy decisions. This shows a remarkable lack of understanding of the 
complexities of the political opportunity structure and the capacity of statesmen 
to react as humans rather than national machines. If a “burning hatred” of Israel 
exists within the AKP, it most certainly hasn’t dictated foreign- policy or even con-
troversial diplomatic decisions. In fact, given the escalation of events since the Da-
vos incident in February 2009, it remains surprising the Erdoğan’s rhetoric has not 
been more vehement, both due to the personal insult that was the failure of peace- 
talks with Syria, Peres’ denial of an apology over Davos, and most importantly, the 
lack of apology for Mavi Marmara until more that 2 years after the event, not to 
mention the regional support such denouncements of Israel engenders.
Furthermore, “a burning hatred- based on religious ideology” would seem to 
play into Orientalist ideas about a pre- determined and paradigmatic battle between 
Muslims and Jews. This has no resonance with the AKP’s practice or discourse. 
Erdoğan has always been very clear about the difference between criticising the 
Israeli government, and being anti- Semitic; “The Israeli state and the Israeli people 
are separate issues. I always say that anti- Semitism is a crime against humanity.”10 
Referring to the AKP’s religious ideals as a reason to be critical of Israel under-
mines the core issues of illegal occupation, settlement expansion and high civilian 
mortality, not to mention the ongoing blockade on Gaza which has been termed a 
measure of “collective punishment” by the United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil.11 As such, rather than being caught between burning religious hatreds and a 
need to appear to be what it is not, the opposite seems to be true with the AKP: it is 
9 “Playing with fire: Turkey will get burned”, Hürriyet Daily News, February 21st 2013 
(emphasis added), Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/playing- with- 
fire- turkey- will- get- burned.aspx?pageID=238&nid=41542. 
10 “Ties With Israel Continue Based on Mutual Interests - Turkish PM”, BBC Moni-
toring Europe, 16th February 2009, from Ertür,  C. “A Zionist in Disguise: Tur-
key’s Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Phony Anti- Israeli Rhetoric”, Global Research, 
November 30th 2012. 
11 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the international fact- finding mission 
to investigate violations of international law, including international humanitarian 
and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships car-
rying humanitarian assistance. (Human Rights Council: Fifteenth session, Septem-
ber 2010) p. 13.
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caught between pragmatic concerns, and a need to say what it cannot do regarding 
Israel. Criticism of Israel has been utilised strategically by the AKP, although not 
as extensively as in Arab countries, “for Turkish domestic political consumption.”12 
During the AKP’s first term, the level of economic, diplomatic and military coop-
eration between the two countries improved dramatically, negating the idea that 
an Islamic government’s religious identity precludes good relations with Israel. 
Thus, connecting these two dots (Islam being a priori anti- Israeli), in the linear 
fashion prevalent in Western political analysis seems ill- informed (not to mention 
ill- advised). This ideological straight jacket, which is employed selectively regard-
ing Muslim rather than secular Turkish leaders or Christian democrats abroad, 
and the level of political culturalism it entrenches is a highly detrimental fallacy 
and. As aforementioned, has the capacity to become a self- fulfilling prophesy as 
Western and Israeli policy- makers perceive actions to be a result of ideational ir-
rationality and respond accordingly.
The Aftermath: Operation Cast Lead
Israel and Turkey are two of the most militarised states in the developed world. 
They both rely on compulsory military service and had, until the new millennium, 
a highly securitised perspective of both internal and external actors. Thus, from 
the signing of the Joint Military Cooperation Agreement in 1996, Israel and Tur-
key enjoyed beneficial military cooperation, often used to demonstrate strength 
towards mutual enemies such as Syria. Since the Cold War onwards, Turkey and 
Israel have sustained a triad of military, intelligence and defence relations, and 
signed more mutual agreements under the AKP than any other government. How-
ever, from 2009 onwards, there has been a dramatic change of policy, best dem-
onstrated in October 2009, when Turkey barred Israel from participation in joint 
military exercises, apparently due to the recent Operation Cast Lead. This is one of 
the first clear examples of public opinion actively conditioning Turkey’s foreign- 
policy behaviour. There was intense debate and anger in Turkey’s public sphere 
over Israeli actions during the catastrophic Operation Cast Lead, and particular 
contestation over why and to what purpose the Israeli air force should be included 
in training exercises during the Anatolian Eagle air force drill. As Erdoğan stated; 
“I could not deny the request of my people, it was in this direction.”13 This is a clear 
example of public and state discourse finally catching up to policy formation, and 
one of the first examples of the AKP endorsing public statements and protests. 
Erdoğan stated on public television soon after this event that; “Turkey has never, in 
12 Landau, Jacob M. “Turkey’s Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan. State Identity and 
Security in the Middle East and Caucasus.” Middle Eastern Studies, 47.6, 2011, p. 137
13 Quoted in: Balci, A. and Kardaş, T. “The Changing Dynamics of Turkey’s Relations 
with Israel: An Analysis of ‘Securitization’”, Insight Turkey, Vol.  14, No.  2/2012, 
p. 116.
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its history, been on the side of persecutors, it has always defended the oppressed”14, 
highlighting the dialogic ideology behind such controversial decision- making. 
Almost immediately after Turkey’s display of dissatisfaction with Israel, Turkey 
joined in similar training activities with Syria, a sworn enemy of the Israel state 
with whom it has been at war since the 1967 war and Israel’s subsequent occupa-
tion of the Golan Heights in 1967. This was undoubtedly the lowest point thus far 
in Turkish- Israeli military cooperation, and also, a sign of things to come.
Nevertheless, this low point by no means marked the end of joint Turkish- 
Israeli military activities, with Erdoğan purportedly stating that; “Our relations 
with Israel continue based on mutual interests. Those who leave the table in fury 
return to it with losses. Some have suggested that we end Israeli training flights 
in Konya… Indeed, our General Staff also announced that relations with Israel will 
continue in accordance with Turkey’s interests. Military contracts and orders also 
remain in force. There are many agreements with Israel, old and new. These all re-
main in force. We have to be very careful in interstate relations.”15 Joint military ac-
tivities continued, including an Israeli- Turkey naval exercise in August 2009. Thus, 
the damage done here, regarding military partnerships at least, was minimal. Busi-
ness continued as usual. However, Operation Cast Lead sparked the recent spiral in 
diplomatic tensions between Israel and Turkey for a less transparent reason than 
the Turkish public spheres anger or Erdoğan’s condemnation; the crux of the issue 
was actually Turkish mediation efforts between Israel and Syria being thwarted 
and Israel’s failure to inform Turkey of the forthcoming Operation Cast Lead.
In the day’s preceding Cast Lead. Erdoğan had taken monumental steps to 
rekindle dialogue between Syria and Israel, holding multiple proximity talks in 
Ankara, during which Erdoğan believed some historic breakthroughs had been 
achieved. The final meeting with Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Olmert occurred just 
days before Cast Lead, with no mention of the forthcoming disaster. When the in-
cursion began, it was taken on a distinctly personal level, as an insult to Erdoğan’s 
negotiation efforts. According to Erdoğan, “This operation, launched despite all 
of these facts, is also disrespectful to Turkey.”16 Furthermore, following the elec-
tion of Netanyahu, Turkey was neither thanked, nor asked to restart its mediation 
14 “Turkey’s Action Towards Israel Worry US”, Jerusalem Post, October 17th 2009, 
Available at: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1255694828871&pagenam
e=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
15 “Ties With Israel Continue Based on Mutual Interests - Turkish PM”, BBC Moni-
toring Europe, 16th February 2009, from Ertür, C. “A Zionist in Disguise: Turkey’s 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Phony Anti- Israeli Rhetoric”, Global Research, November 
30th 2012. 
16 “Erdoğan angered by Israel’s Gaza campaign,” Today’s Zaman, December 29th 2008, 
Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news- 162602- erdogan- angered-by- israels- 
gaza- campaign.html. 
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efforts,17 in another blow to the Turkey’s self- understanding as a mediating power 
and trust in Israel.
Revealingly, Israeli and US discourse over Turkey’s increasing ties with Syria, 
oft cited as demonstrative of the AKP’s foreign- policy being dictated by Mus-
lim solidarity are undermined by two crucial issues. Firstly, the AKP’s early re-
lationship with Syria was aligned with both EU and U.S discourse and practice 
of “rapprochement” and Davutoğlu’s policy of “soft power”. Secondly, Erdoğan’s 
behaviour since the start of the crisis in Syria in 2011 has been fully on side with 
NATO and the EU, taking a more active role in preventing the expansion of the 
threat, something which has the potential to put Israel’s existence in jeopardy. In 
fact, given the mutual threat to Israel and Turkey posed by both the current crisis 
and also the disturbing nature of many of the organisations who would be part of a 
post- Assad regime, it was remarkably short sighted on both Erdoğan’s and Netan-
yahu’s behalf that they failed to re- establish direct dialogue regarding this matter 
until the use of chemical weapons in Syria and increasing fear of regional spillover 
from this conflict changed the game. Amongst the other aforementioned factors, 
the Turkish- Israeli breakdown can also be attributed to Erdoğan’s outright support 
for the Arab Spring in general, which was disturbing to Jerusalem. Although Syria 
and Israel have technically been at war since 1967, the status quo in Syria was by 
no means as threatening to Israel as the current political turmoil which has seen 
the first conflict in the Golan Heights for nearly 40 years. The regional shift in bal-
ance of power, disruption of the status quo antagonists and the emergence of new 
actors in Syria and Egypt, many of whom are from populist Islamist movements is 
far more dangerous to Israel. Consequently, Turkey’s ongoing support, both rhe-
torically and with weapons and shelter, to the Syrian rebels is undermining Israel’s 
stability in the region. However, a mutual interest in supporting the moderate 
Sunni rebels as opposed to the extremist militia also operating in the region can be 
seen as one of the primary motivation for the recent stabilisation of Turkish- Israeli 
relations. The changing political environment of Turkey and Israel may impel the 
full re- establishment of relations, due to their common interest in stabilising the 
region and particularly Syria, interestingly, the reason the Turkish- Israeli strategic 
partnership was established in the golden age
It is fairly well acknowledged now in post- positivist social- science that politics 
often takes place at a much subtler level than diplomatic talks and foreign- policy 
narratives. The political significance of popular culture is the most obvious exam-
ple of “semiotic practices”.18 This refers to a process of meaning production through 
the use of language ad culture as “systems of signification.”19 When a culturally and 
17 Inbar,  E. “Israeli- Turkish Tensions and their International Ramifications”, Orbis 
55.1, 2011, p. 134.
18 Wedeen, Lisa. “Conceptualizing culture: Possibilities for political science”, Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 96.4, 2002, p. 713.
19 Ibid, p. 714.
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politically significant narrative emerges through bottom up rather than top down 
processes to become a national discourse, it are far more threatening due to the 
natural, and thus more entrenched nature of the opinion, and the decreased abil-
ity of the state to control subversive narratives. Such an event occurred between 
Turkey and Israel as a result of a popular Turkish TV series, “Ayrılık” (Farewell), 
which depicted IDF soldiers killing Palestinian children during Operation Cast 
Lead. This is now a popular narrative in Turkey, regarding the Israeli government’s 
activities in Gaza and has a definitive impact on public opinion. The subsequent 
humiliation felt by Israel and inability to deal with this through normal diplomatic 
channels or through using a “hearts and minds” strategy led Israel to utilise its 
own semiotic practices to undermine to legitimacy of Turkish opinion on this mat-
ter. Turkey’s ambassador to Israel, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, was called to meet with 
Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, to discuss complaints regarding 
this show, which notably was aired by Turkey’s public channel, Turkish Radio and 
Television. The presence of only the Israel flag (a break with normal diplomatic 
procedure) and the purposeful seating of the ambassador in a lower chair, a move 
which Ayalon drew the Israeli presses attention to, indicates that Ayalon set out to 
deliberately humiliate the ambassador, and by extension, the Turkish public. This 
move united the public, the AKP and even the CHP in resounding criticism, which 
in an important and almost unprecedented turn, actually impelled an apology from 
the Israeli government.
These contentious moves, the original humiliation and subsequent apology, can 
be said to have been motivated by public opinion and economic concerns respec-
tively. Right wing and nationalist Israelis were outraged after the airing of the TV 
series, and Ayalon, as a member of the Yisrael Beitenu party, believed his actions 
would endear him to public opinion. However, once Ankara threatened the seces-
sion of diplomatic and thus, rhetorically at least, economic relations as a reaction, 
Ayalon was pressured by the powers that be, namely Ehud Olmert, to issue this 
statement; “I had no intention to humiliate you personally and apologize for the 
way the démarche was handled and perceived… Please convey this to the Turk-
ish people for whom we have great respect.”20 Time magazine wrote of this; “the 
strategic ties are driven by mutual national interests that trump internal politics.” 
However, such artificial extraction of internal politics from national interest is a 
fallacy. Turkey’s national interest in this case was to derive an apology which 
would placate the public sphere, a necessity in order to continue military, diplo-
matic and economic relations with Israel openly, something they can no longer do 
for precisely this reason. Thus, internal politics were not trumped by national in-
terest, or vice versa, as they are mutually constitutive porous entities. The ongoing 
reduction of the public sphere, and more specifically, the role of public opinion in 
20 Klein, A, “Israel and Turkey: Anatomy of a Dissing War” Time Magazine, January 
14th 2010, Available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1953746,00.
html. 
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limiting the possible actions of a state perpetuates the absence of holistic analysis 
regarding Turkey’s foreign- policy behaviour, as such behaviour is entirely interde-
pendent with societal, historical and ideational variables.
The incident at Davos, otherwise known as the “one minute” crisis, in which 
Erdoğan walked off stage during the World Economic Forum as a response to a 
perceived injustice from the moderator and angry rhetoric from Israeli President, 
Shimon Peres, gave a huge boost to the ideological legitimacy of Erdoğan. Both the 
rhetoric he used and his decision to walk off stage must be subject to interrogation 
as they are very revealing about the relationship between public opinion and state 
discourse in Turkey. Although Erdoğan undoubtedly takes a personal approach 
to the plight of the Palestinians, the overtly emotional language employed during 
this speech is resonant of propaganda. For example, although perhaps warranted, 
particularly in the eyes of the Turkish public, Erdoğan’s statement to Peres that; 
“you are older than I am. But the volume of your voice is too high. And I know this 
is because of the guilt psychology… When it is time to kill, you know how to kill 
well. I know well how you kill children on beaches, how you shoot them”21, stands 
in sharp contrast to the diplomatic language usually employed by state leaders, 
even during such politically turbulent times. As such, the aim of Erdoğan’s emotive 
language would seem to be mobilisation of the Turkish public. But to what ends 
given Turkey’s previously discussed reliance on Israel for military and energy rela-
tions? This example of Turkey appearing to stand up in the face of Israeli impunity, 
and the subsequent emergence of this as a discursive norm in Turkey, is aimed 
at demonstrating to the people that democracy is effective and that the govern-
ment is responsive. The approval rating of this event speaks volumes, with 81.7% 
supporting Erdoğan’s remarks, and only 10.2 disapproving and a further 78.3% 
approving of the walkout.22 By voicing public sentiments during such a high level 
meeting, Erdoğan boosted his democratic and ideological legitimacy, both at home 
and abroad. Furthermore, with local elections shortly following this demonstration 
in March 2009, a more cynical motivation can be highlighted; that of political ma-
noeuvring and voter manipulation. Between January the 26th and the 30th, after 
Davos, Erdoğan’s approval rating sky- rocketed from 55% to 74%.23
Similarly, Peres’s demonstration after the incident seemed entirely conditioned 
by personal and state machismo and a need to salvage Israeli public opinion in 
his favour with elections forthcoming. In fact, Erdoğan pointed to this in an in-
terview with the New York Times, directly after Davos, in which he made a much 
more forceful, nuanced and pragmatic argument for a cessation of violence and 
21 World- January29- Switzerland- Davos- Peres, Reuters, January 29th 2009, Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/29/world- jan29- switzerland-davos-peres- 
erdo- idUS812520090129. 
22 “Davos Crisis”, Metropoll - Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar, January 2009, Available 
at: http://www.metropoll.com.tr/report/davos- crisis. 
23 Ibid.
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accountability; “We have a serious relationship. But the current Israeli government 
should check itself. They should not exploit this issue for the upcoming elections 
in Israel.”24 In a Turkish transcript of a phone- call between Peres and Erdoğan it 
was written that Peres apologised for his actions during Davos. Subsequently, the 
Israeli government issued a statement asserting that the words “I’m sorry” were 
never said by Peres.25 Knowing whose account of events is true in this matter is 
both impossible and irrelevant. This became both a personal and a national matter 
of pride for the two leaders and consequently, concessions, apologies and mean-
ingful dialogue were pushed to the side, replaced by egoism and competition.
The Aftermath: Mavi Marmara
The events which occurred on this fateful day are still held up to much contesta-
tion. As such, this chapter will focus not on attributing blame but rather reflect on 
the aftermath, and the effect this has had on Turkish- Israeli relations. Similar to the 
Davos incident, the game of blame attribution become irrelevant at a point, as the 
state discourse, whether truthful or not, become assimilated into a social/national 
narrative of events, preventing, until very recently, concessions on both sides due 
to national dignity and pride. By analysing the immediate reactions to the Mavi 
Marmara incident, attention is drawn to the polarity of Turkish and Israeli event 
interpretation and cognitive processing.26 These, when combined with opposing 
organisational frameworks within each country, contrasting institutional norms 
and strong societal, media and military actors, produce an entirely different narra-
tive and thus, policy regarding the shared events in question. The actors involved, 
explicitly, the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) were mobilised and opera-
tionalised due to a variety of political opportunities, notably, the recent Operation 
Cast Lead, critical Turkish, and notably, international condemnation of Operation 
Cast Lead and subsequent questioning of the legitimacy of the Gaza blockade, and 
furthermore, the rise of transnational human rights activism, resource sharing and 
alliances in the new millennium. It is interesting, and unprecedented, that a hu-
man rights based movement should have such a dramatic and detrimental effect on 
bilateral relations in Turkey. I will discuss briefly the specific political opportunity 
which allowed for this event to arise, based on Tarrow’s original model.27 Firstly, 
the state had indicated it was open to societal contestation regarding Israel in the 
24 “Palestine today is an open- air prison”, The Washington Post, January 1st 2009, 
Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/01/30/
AR2009013002809_3.html. 
25 Barak R, “Is this the transcript of Peres’ call to Erdoğan following the Davos spat?”, 
Haaretz, January 1st 2009, Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/is- this- the- 
transcript- of- peres- call- to- erdogan- following- davos- spat- 1.267121. 
26 Taber, Charles S., op cit. p. 32.
27 Tarrow, Sidney  G. (1988), Power in Movement, New  York: Cambridge University 
Pres, pp. 76- 80.
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aftermath of Operation Cast Lead. Secondly, the stability of the Turkish- Israeli 
alignment was already being challenged by the government, leaving further room 
for societal subversion. Thirdly, the international reaction to Cast Lead brought 
forward a number of social organisations whom the IHH and others could ally and 
share resources/knowledge with. Finally, there was not only division within the 
AKP on how to handle this issue, but actual support, with some members of par-
liament intending on joining the flotilla, highlighting the openness of the Turkish 
government and facilitation of protest activities by the state.
A lesser know occurrence preceding this catastrophe was the efforts made by 
the Turkish government in the lead up to the flotillas departure. Initially the gov-
ernment aimed at preventing the flotilla from leaving and when it became ap-
parent this would not be possible, efforts were made to negotiate with both the 
Israeli government and the leaders of the Mavi Marmara to ensure that if difficul-
ties occurred, the ships would turn back towards the Egyptian port of al- Arish, 
unharmed. According to an interview by International Crisis Group with Ahmet 
Emin Dağ, IHH Middle East coordinator, he was requested not to go directly to 
Gaza on the basis of already deteriorating relations with Israel due to Turkish 
objection to increasing sanctions on Iran..28 Nevertheless, the flotilla departed, 
according to the Turkish government, alongside assurances from Israel that un-
warranted force would not be used.29 The subsequent death of 8 Turkish citizens 
and an American citizen with Turkish heritage caused understandable outrage in 
Ankara, read as insulting on multiple layers and at least partially due to the previ-
ously reached agreement of non- violence.30 Davutoğlu stated to the United Nations 
Security Council that; “This is tantamount to banditry and piracy. It is murder 
conducted by a State. It has no excuses, no justification whatsoever … And Israel 
has blood on its hands …. This is a black day in the history of humanity, where the 
distance between terrorists and States has been blurred”.31 If Turkey’s understand-
ing precluded grey areas, so did Israel’s, who believed their actions to be legal, 
self- defence, and in its national interest.
The fact this event occurred in international waters added insult to injury as far 
as the Turkish government and public were concerned. As such, there was an im-
mediate and unequivocal call for a credible investigation, an apology from Israel, 
compensation for the families of the dead and an end to the blockade on Gaza, 
ending with the statement that “Turkey will evaluate her relations with Israel 
28 “Turkey’s Crisis over Israel and Iran”, International Crisis Group: Europe Report No: 
208 - 8 September 2010. p. 10.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 “Full text of Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s speech in UN Security Council,” 
Sunday’s Zaman, June 1st 2010, Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
Detail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=211758. 
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according to the response of Israeli Government to these conditions.”32 Nearly a 
year later, Israel’s failure to fulfil any of these requirements and with the additional 
insult of the findings of the UN commissioned Palmer report, Turkey began the 
legal processes which paved the way for the current state of affairs. Ankara initi-
ated unprecedented sanctions against Israel, expelling the Israeli ambassador in 
September 2011, reducing diplomatic relations to the level of “second secretary”; 
which is close to non- existent, as revealingly, if unhelpfully, demonstrated by the 
lack of details regarding Turkish- Israeli bilateral relations of any kind on the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs website.
Davutoğlu stated during a press conference in Ankara, that; “The time has come 
for Israel to pay for its stance that sees it above international laws and disregards 
human conscience… The first and foremost result is that Israel is going to be de-
void of Turkey’s friendship.”33 Erdoğan pledged his legal and financial support to 
the families of those aboard the ship to pursue justice against Israel soldiers, a 
pledge which culminated in a highly publicised, if futile trial in Istanbul, to the 
consternation of Israeli officials. Additionally, Turkey discussed taking Israel to the 
International Court of Justice over the blockade, a discursive move which further 
destroyed political relations. Contentiously, Erdoğan also promised that to ensure 
freedom of navigation, future flotillas to Gaza would be accompanied by Turkish 
war- ships, a promise he has failed to fulfil thankfully, as it would be read in Israel 
as tantamount to a declaration of war. After the publication of the Palmer report, 
Ankara stated that all military agreements would be cancelled, having already can-
celled three main military exercises directly after the incident; the land force- “Pi-
geon of Peace”, naval- “Reliant Mermaid” which had been taking place since 1998, 
and finally, the “Natural Disaster Preparedness Operation”. However, cooperation 
between Turkey and Israel continued when actual disasters arise such as Turk-
ish helicopters deployed for assistance during the Haifa fires in December 2010 
and Israeli aid during the Van earthquake of 2011. Nevertheless, further defence 
and intelligence cooperation was scaled back, most notably, Israel’s use of Turkish 
air- space. Strikingly, although putting an end to joint military activities, defence 
contracts, unlike energy and water contracts, continued relatively unharmed.
The issue was perceived in Turkey as related to Israel’s on- going refusal to 
make any concessions relating to occupied Palestinian territory and lack of pro-
gress regarding the stagnant peace- process. On the other hand, Turkey’s un-
equivocal discursive if not material support for the Palestinians is perceived in 
Israel as reflective of ideologically based policy- making. This is seen as a highly 
32 “Blatant violation of international law by Israel: the attack on the freedom flotilla 
facts”, Turkish foreign ministry, June 2010, Available at: http://vasington.be.mfa.gov.
tr/images/localCache/1/b15prjzpaplfysi5nz31z4qmFreedom%20Flotilla.pdf. 
33 “Turkey expels Israeli diplomats, suspends military ties after UN report”, Today’s 
Zaman, September 2nd 2011, Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news- 
255543- turkey- downgrades- ties- with- israel- suspends- military- agreements.html. 
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aftermath of Operation Cast Lead. Secondly, the stability of the Turkish- Israeli 
alignment was already being challenged by the government, leaving further room 
for societal subversion. Thirdly, the international reaction to Cast Lead brought 
forward a number of social organisations whom the IHH and others could ally and 
share resources/knowledge with. Finally, there was not only division within the 
AKP on how to handle this issue, but actual support, with some members of par-
liament intending on joining the flotilla, highlighting the openness of the Turkish 
government and facilitation of protest activities by the state.
A lesser know occurrence preceding this catastrophe was the efforts made by 
the Turkish government in the lead up to the flotillas departure. Initially the gov-
ernment aimed at preventing the flotilla from leaving and when it became ap-
parent this would not be possible, efforts were made to negotiate with both the 
Israeli government and the leaders of the Mavi Marmara to ensure that if difficul-
ties occurred, the ships would turn back towards the Egyptian port of al- Arish, 
unharmed. According to an interview by International Crisis Group with Ahmet 
Emin Dağ, IHH Middle East coordinator, he was requested not to go directly to 
Gaza on the basis of already deteriorating relations with Israel due to Turkish 
objection to increasing sanctions on Iran..28 Nevertheless, the flotilla departed, 
according to the Turkish government, alongside assurances from Israel that un-
warranted force would not be used.29 The subsequent death of 8 Turkish citizens 
and an American citizen with Turkish heritage caused understandable outrage in 
Ankara, read as insulting on multiple layers and at least partially due to the previ-
ously reached agreement of non- violence.30 Davutoğlu stated to the United Nations 
Security Council that; “This is tantamount to banditry and piracy. It is murder 
conducted by a State. It has no excuses, no justification whatsoever … And Israel 
has blood on its hands …. This is a black day in the history of humanity, where the 
distance between terrorists and States has been blurred”.31 If Turkey’s understand-
ing precluded grey areas, so did Israel’s, who believed their actions to be legal, 
self- defence, and in its national interest.
The fact this event occurred in international waters added insult to injury as far 
as the Turkish government and public were concerned. As such, there was an im-
mediate and unequivocal call for a credible investigation, an apology from Israel, 
compensation for the families of the dead and an end to the blockade on Gaza, 
ending with the statement that “Turkey will evaluate her relations with Israel 
28 “Turkey’s Crisis over Israel and Iran”, International Crisis Group: Europe Report No: 
208 - 8 September 2010. p. 10.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 “Full text of Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s speech in UN Security Council,” 
Sunday’s Zaman, June 1st 2010, Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
Detail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=211758. 
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according to the response of Israeli Government to these conditions.”32 Nearly a 
year later, Israel’s failure to fulfil any of these requirements and with the additional 
insult of the findings of the UN commissioned Palmer report, Turkey began the 
legal processes which paved the way for the current state of affairs. Ankara initi-
ated unprecedented sanctions against Israel, expelling the Israeli ambassador in 
September 2011, reducing diplomatic relations to the level of “second secretary”; 
which is close to non- existent, as revealingly, if unhelpfully, demonstrated by the 
lack of details regarding Turkish- Israeli bilateral relations of any kind on the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs website.
Davutoğlu stated during a press conference in Ankara, that; “The time has come 
for Israel to pay for its stance that sees it above international laws and disregards 
human conscience… The first and foremost result is that Israel is going to be de-
void of Turkey’s friendship.”33 Erdoğan pledged his legal and financial support to 
the families of those aboard the ship to pursue justice against Israel soldiers, a 
pledge which culminated in a highly publicised, if futile trial in Istanbul, to the 
consternation of Israeli officials. Additionally, Turkey discussed taking Israel to the 
International Court of Justice over the blockade, a discursive move which further 
destroyed political relations. Contentiously, Erdoğan also promised that to ensure 
freedom of navigation, future flotillas to Gaza would be accompanied by Turkish 
war- ships, a promise he has failed to fulfil thankfully, as it would be read in Israel 
as tantamount to a declaration of war. After the publication of the Palmer report, 
Ankara stated that all military agreements would be cancelled, having already can-
celled three main military exercises directly after the incident; the land force- “Pi-
geon of Peace”, naval- “Reliant Mermaid” which had been taking place since 1998, 
and finally, the “Natural Disaster Preparedness Operation”. However, cooperation 
between Turkey and Israel continued when actual disasters arise such as Turk-
ish helicopters deployed for assistance during the Haifa fires in December 2010 
and Israeli aid during the Van earthquake of 2011. Nevertheless, further defence 
and intelligence cooperation was scaled back, most notably, Israel’s use of Turkish 
air- space. Strikingly, although putting an end to joint military activities, defence 
contracts, unlike energy and water contracts, continued relatively unharmed.
The issue was perceived in Turkey as related to Israel’s on- going refusal to 
make any concessions relating to occupied Palestinian territory and lack of pro-
gress regarding the stagnant peace- process. On the other hand, Turkey’s un-
equivocal discursive if not material support for the Palestinians is perceived in 
Israel as reflective of ideologically based policy- making. This is seen as a highly 
32 “Blatant violation of international law by Israel: the attack on the freedom flotilla 
facts”, Turkish foreign ministry, June 2010, Available at: http://vasington.be.mfa.gov.
tr/images/localCache/1/b15prjzpaplfysi5nz31z4qmFreedom%20Flotilla.pdf. 
33 “Turkey expels Israeli diplomats, suspends military ties after UN report”, Today’s 
Zaman, September 2nd 2011, Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news- 
255543- turkey- downgrades- ties- with- israel- suspends- military- agreements.html. 
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threatening development given Turkey has long stood as Israel’s only Muslim ally 
and regional ally more broadly. However, these issues require a more nuanced 
analysis. Turkey’s strategic and economic proximity to contentious actors in West 
Asia; particularly Iran and Hamas, impel it to take a more active role in mediation 
and negotiation efforts. Similarly, a reactive public sphere regarding developments 
in Gaza and the Mavi Marmara incident should be seen as a distinctive pressure on 
the AKP to utilise the fiery discourse which has now become the norm. This attack 
was perceived as directed against civil- society actors which “left an indelible mark 
in the hearts and minds of the Turkish people”34 according to Davutoğlu. The Mavi 
Marmara incident provoked a strong and consolidated reaction in the Turkish pub-
lic sphere, including widespread protests and direct pressure from civil organisa-
tions to cut all ties with Israel. Importantly, the Turkish public resoundingly read 
this attack as aimed at undermining Erdoğan’s, and thus, Turkey’s, domestic and 
international credibility (45.4 %),35 rather than as related to security concerns. Such 
a narrative has become prevalent, with the public understanding of Israeli actions 
such as the “low chair incident” and Mavi Marmara as aimed at inhibiting Turkey’s 
regional and domestic development and power. Strikingly, 60.6% of the Turkish 
public were not satisfied with the AKP’s reaction to the attack according to a pub-
lic opinion survey conducted by Metropol- Strategic and Social Research Center.36 
Given that 63.6 % of the Turkish public in 2010 believed that Turkey should sever 
ties with Israel and moderately improved data from 2012 showing the number to 
be 51.3 %,37 the current state of this damaged relationship and provocative rhetoric 
adopted by both sides seem hardly surprising.
Turkey utilised its NATO veto to prevent the inclusion of Israel in the alliance 
as a reaction to the aforementioned issues. Erdoğan has taken a strong position re-
garding this matter, stating that; “We have our own red lines. For us, to be involved 
in NATO with Israel is never considerable. To be with such a cruel understanding 
would conflict with our structure, history and culture.”38 That said, despite these 
tensions, in December 2012 Ankara agreed to retract their NATO veto preventing 
Israeli participation in non- military NATO activities in 2013. If such a result ap-
pears at odds with previous diplomatic and political developments between Israel 
and Turkey since 2008, that’s because it is. The NATO approval of Turkey’s Pa-
triot missile request in order to defend its borders from Syrian encroachment was 
read as a timely and coincidental development, leading to assumptions in Israeli 
diplomatic circles that this issue has been used as leverage to coerce Erdoğan into 
34 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Interview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu”, Op cit.
35 Metropoll - Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar, Op cit.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. 
38 “Turkey ‘blocked’ Israeli NATO steps”, The Hürriyet Daily News, February 6th 2013, 
Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/turkey- blocked- israeli- natosteps.
aspxpageID=238&nID=40566&NewsCatID=33. 
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appeasement.39 Davutoğlu flatly denied such assertions, claiming that the Israeli 
media “conducted an operation”,40 presumably aimed at undermining Turkey’s in-
ternational credibility. Although this has not been articulated by leaders in either 
Turkey or Israel, the deployment of Patriot missiles is an important move from 
Turkey. Syria, Iran and Russia have been highly critical of this step and relations 
have deteriorated as a result. The Patriot missiles would not only protect Turkey, 
but also Israel if problems with neighbours such as Iran and Syria continue to 
deteriorate at their current pace. For those who adhere to the pendulum theory, 
or shifting axis thesis, this event should place Turkey firmly back in the Western 
camp. Furthermore, the role of America in negotiating a rare concession from Tur-
key during this time of political turmoil highlights a key variable in Turkish- Israeli 
relations; the U.S. This event once again reveals the lack of “alliance” between 
Turkey and Israel, rather the tenuous and ever fluctuating “alignment”41 regarding 
international affairs based on a mutual reliance on the U.S. This further demon-
strates that Turkish- Israeli relations may not have been subject to the dramatic 
fluctuations they appear to have, due to the lack of solid foundations to begin with.
Once again, the role of the U.S. in negotiating and determining the alliance 
between its two key regional allies has come to the fore. Obama’s trip to Israel in 
March, 2013, finally saw the Israeil state taking the monumental step of conced-
ing to Turkish demands regarding post- Mavi Marmara normalisation, beginning 
to thaw the three year long diplomatic ice- age. In response to this long awaited 
apology and agreement to pay compensation, Erdoğan has agreed to normalise ties 
between the two countries, also cancelling the highly contentious legal proceed-
ings against the Israeli soldiers involved in the attack. From first glance, it would 
seem that geo- strategic realities have pushed egoism to the side, with both Netan-
yahu and Erdoğan blessing their newly established ties as “vital and strategic for 
regional peace and security,”42 referring to the increasing mutual threat of a nuclear 
Iran and chemically armed militia in Syria, particularly to Israel. Thus, the timing 
of this apology is hardly surprising. However, Erdoğan’s domestic gains from not 
accepting Israel’s apology would have been extensive. So what pushed the AKP to 
do so? Aside from heat from the U.S, the regional security concerns discussed ear-
lier in this chapter and Turkey’s energy concerns which are addressed in the next 
39 Leila Krieger, H. “Israel to join NATO activities amidst Turkey tension”, The Jerusa-
lem Post, December 23rd 2012, Available at: http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAnd-
Politics/Article.aspx?id=297004. 
40 “Turkey: Israel’s participation in NATO not related to Patrots”, Today’s Zaman. 
December 20th 2012, Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/mobile_detailn.
action?newsId=302441. 
41 Bengio, Ofra, and Gencer Özcan. “Changing Relations: Turkish- Israeli- Arab Trian-
gle”, New Trends in Turkish Foreign Affairs: Bridges and Boundaries, 2002: 338.
42 “Israeli PM apologizes to Turkey after Obama push”, Hürriyet Daily News, March 
22nd 2013, Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/israeli- pm- apologizes- 
to- turkey- after- obama- push.aspxnpageID=238&nID=43445&NewsCatID=352. 
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section were the primary factors. Firstly, the AKP is pushing to diversify its energy 
relations, solving its over- reliance on Russia and Iran, an move with impels coop-
eration with Israel. Secondly, the aforementioned use of chemical weapons in Syria 
was a factor as intelligence sharing is highly beneficial for Turkey due to Israel’s 
more extensive intelligence gathering methods and increasing fear from both sides 
that this conflict will spill over Syria’s borders. Thus, Turkey as well as Israel had 
a lot to gain from rekindling relations; namely resuming its post as regional me-
diator, perhaps making some headway regarding NATO cooperation on Syria and 
finally, increasing trust and therefore cooperation with the U.S, a necessity for 
the development of any viable peace- process in Palestine, something Turkey has 
a great interest in establishing. Turkey has held this apology up as exemplary of 
their growing regional power, with Erdoğan stating shortly after the event that 
“We are at the beginning of a process of elevating Turkey to a position so that it 
will again have a say, initiative and power, as it did in the past.”43 This apology does 
indeed have the potential to re- establish Turkey as a regional mediator or even role 
model, which in turn, will solidify Turkish- Israeli relations due to mutual reliance 
and realigning strategies regarding the current transformations taking place in 
Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Even so, it seems that re- establishing the glory 
days of the 1990s is no longer a possibility, as President Abdullah Gül made clear 
in a predictive, if possibly normative statement that “Turkish- Israeli relations can 
never be as before from now on.”44
The domestic timing was also prime within Israel as Netanyahu’s success dur-
ing the elections facilitated this apology due to his relative safety from nationalist 
criticism and the current corruption scandal surrounding Foreign Minister Avig-
dor Liebeman, who has long stood as an obstacle to Turkish- Israeli rapproche-
ment. It is important to briefly discuss the role of Israel’s internal politics here as 
often, Turkish behaviour is reactive rather than active in this regard. The insta-
bility of Israeli politics impels both inflammatory rhetoric and extremism during 
domestic policy formation. The successive election of increasingly right- wing poli-
ticians and “hawks” in Israel is unsurprisingly, a concern for Turkey and a cause 
of public consternation as their draconian policies are put into effect in Palestine. 
It has been argued on multiple occasions that the timing of both Operation Cast 
Lead and the most recent Operation Pillar of Defence came just before elections in 
Israel. Furthermore, both elections heavily impacted on the decision to withhold 
an apology for so long. Once again, it was internal as well as international factors 
which dictated its deliverance as Obama and Netanyahu had hoped to dissuade 
43 “Erdoğan says Israeli apology shows Turkey’s new clout”, The Daily Star, March 23rd, 
2013, Available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle- East/2013/Mar- 23/ 
211253- erdogan- says- israeli- apology- shows- turkeys- new- clout.ashx#axzz2 
SEEVB4DP. 
44 Migdalovitz, C., “Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its 
Aftermath”, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 16th, 2010. 
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Erdoğan from his forthcoming visit to Gaza, during which he will meet leaders 
from both the PA and Hamas, something Israel has a strong interest in preventing 
as Erdoğan’s planned meeting with Hamas would endow them with further legiti-
macy both domestically and internationally. So far, Erdoğan plans to continue with 
this visit, keeping diplomatic relations on a low heat, stating that actions required 
to fully re- establish ties. such as appointing ambassadors, requires more time and 
planning. Abdullah Gül re- articulated such sentiments, stating that “The issue is 
still very fresh, let’s all wait. This is just the first step.”45 Such statements are per-
haps reflective of the AKP’s understanding the public resentment at the Israeli 
states’ actions will not necessarily dissipate at the same rate as diplomatic ties are 
rekindled. Although no longer frozen, such a cool attitude towards this monumen-
tal effort to re- start relations should caution academics and political analysts alike 
not to rejoice too soon.
Erdoğan continues to use a similar discourse to the one before Israel’s apology, 
now alongside a new, victorious language due to his success in securing unprec-
edented Israeli concessions. This is highlighted best by examining the billboards 
appearing around Ankara city centre which depict a forlorn Netanyahu under a 
triumphant Erdoğan, stating first that “Israel apologised to Turkey”, followed by 
an address from Ankara municipality; “Dear Mr Prime Minister, for you to enable 
us feel such pride, we are grateful to you.” Such triumphalism has resounded from 
Erdoğan since this event, including statements inferring that this apology signals 
the start of a new epoch in which the balance of power has shifted in Turkey’s 
favour. Similarly, Erdoğan’s highly controversial statement that “Zionism is equal 
to fascism” highlights how normalised unmoderated discourse has become within 
Turkish political circles. Although since Netanyahu and Erdoğan have begun talk-
ing, Erdoğan has sought to clarify these statements, he has not retracted them, 
stating that “My several statements openly condemning anti- Semitism clearly 
display my position on this issue. In this context, I stand behind my remarks in 
[the United Nations Conference in] Vienna.”46 Underlining such discursive land- 
mines are ongoing potent problems such as the ever static peace- process, ongo-
ing settlement building in occupied territory painting a dismal picture regarding 
the chances of a viable Palestinian state and of course, Turkey’s domestic gains 
from vitriolic discourse. Similarly, there remains both a public and state mistrust 
of  Israel’s promises which has impelled the aforementioned caution until Israel 
actually fulfils its commitments. Turkish public opinion and thus, state discourse 
if not policy, will not accept Israel if it is not seen to be making resolution efforts 
45 “Israel’s apology to shift Mideast balances: Turkish PM”, Hürriyet Daily News, March 
27th 2013, Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/israels- apology- to- 
shift- mideast- balances- turkish- pm.aspx?pageID=238&nid=43713. 
46 Keinon, H., “Netanyahu apologizes to Turkey over Gaza flotilla”, The Jerusa-
lem Post, March 23rd, 2013, Available at: http://www.jpost.com/International/
Obama- Netanyahu- Erdogan- speak- by- phone- 307423. 
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with Palestine. Thus, normalisation is more dependent on Israeli policy than on 
Turkish at this point in time.
Although the Israeli government has fully agreed to two of Turkey’s three de-
mands, they have faltered on the final, and most demanding stipulation; that Israel 
fully removes the Gaza blockade as a precursor to reviving formal diplomatic ties 
such as appointing ambassadors. Although Israel has agreed to, and begun to ease 
of the blockade and an end to the blockade on civilian goods, such statements have 
been made before by the Israeli government with little or no follow- up. As such, 
Erdoğan’s visit to Gaza will focus on witnessing the extent of Israel’s fulfilment of 
the third criteria. It will be this final demand which dictates the future of Turkish- 
Israeli relations. So long as Israel continues any form of blockade against Gaza, 
Turkey is has no imperative to push for full re- establishment of relations, nor will 
such relations receive much domestic legitimacy. Thus, although arguably war-
ranted, for full normalisation of relations, Ankara needs to reduce its demands on 
the Israeli government, namely, the request that Israel fully removes the blockade 
on Gaza before diplomatic relations can fully resume, an unlikely occurrence based 
on even a cursory evaluation of Israeli actions, particularly settlement activities in 
occupied territories, particularly since Abbas’s successful bid for statehood at the 
UN. The level of confrontation incorporated into the rhetoric is, at the time of writ-
ing, standing in the way of resuming necessary diplomatic relations, Despite the 
positive effects of such actions and discourse on Turkey’s regional standing and 
on appeasing public opinion at home by diverting public attention, such absolute 
rhetoric is also preventing Turkey from emerging as the strong regional mediator 
that was its previous role, negotiating with Israeli, Syria and Iran, and taking the 
lead during core Arab- Israel peace talks.
If Israel wishes to improve its relations with Turkey, it needs to be aware that 
Turkey, as a rare ally in the region, is constrained and provoked by a number of 
social and ideational variables, particularly in continuing to seek the fulfilment of 
all three post- Mavi Marmara stipulations as not doing so would have lost Erdoğan 
much needed domestic legitimacy. With the recent apology from Netanyahu and 
acceptance from Erdoğan both countries have demonstratively employed a hedon-
istic calculus to determine whether the domestic benefits of their feud outweighed 
the strategic benefits of normalising relations, finding the former to be lacking 
substance when compared to pressing regional concerns. As such, we may see 
the temporary establishment of a relationship resembling the “golden era” with 
strategic threat perception once again dominating the agenda. However, the recent 
apology will not suffice entirely, nor will it placate public opinion in either coun-
try. It is also important for both countries to recognise this issue not only to be a 
matter of international law and human rights, but also of national dignity, egoism 
and historical memory. This is just one small step on a very long road to recovering 
normal relations, if such a thing has ever in fact existed between Turkey and Israel. 
Solving the Mavi Marmara crisis does little to address the multitude of other issues 
discussed in this chapter, which cause divergences between these two powers and 
as such, should not be overplayed. As aforementioned, a state heavy reconciliation 
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bid will not be, and indeed was not, accepted by society. Both the Turkish and the 
Israeli rejection of the legitimacy of such an approach highlights the need for more 
society based cooperation and therefore, reconciliation.
Business as Usual
It was the worst of times, it was the best of times
Having discussed the fluctuations and limitation of Turkish- Israeli political rela-
tions and the instability between these two contrasting powers, it is now time to 
juxtapose this with economic relations, highlighting the sharp dichotomy between 
political rhetoric and actions, and economic cooperation. The spectres of Opera-
tion Cast Lead, Davos and Mavi Marmara, although haunting discourse and diplo-
macy, have had a negligible impact on blossoming trade relations between Turkey 
and Israel.
With trade relations only having been established to any significant degree in 
1996, after the signing of the free trade agreement, Turkish- Israeli economic co-
operation has been upgraded in as remarkable a fashion as political relations were 
downgraded. Starting from $449 million in 1996, bilateral trade has flourished be-
tween Turkey and Israel under the AKP’s jurisdiction. In 2011, the last recorded 
statistics on the Ministry of Economy, imports from Israel stood at $2 billion with 
$2.4 billion being exported to Israel (it is notable that no such statistics are offered 
for 2012 however). This phenomenal growth all during a time which by all ac-
counts, is the worst period of Turkish- Israeli relations since the states inception. 
Between 2002 and 2008, a period in which political relations were taut, but not 
catastrophic, bilateral trade increased by 14.6 %. Although, the growth rate in 2009 
fell quite dramatically, by 28 %, this was attributed to the global financial crisis 
rather than political relations by Uriel Lynn, the president of the Federation of 
Israeli Chambers of Commerce.47 By 2010, bilateral trade was back to it’s previous 
level, with a 30.7 % increase seen between 2010 and 2011, the most political tumul-
tuous time for Turkish- Israeli relations.
As aforementioned, 2008 and 2010, two of the worst times for bilateral dip-
lomatic relations in Turkish- Israeli history, also saw some of the best times for 
economic cooperation, far exceeding the bilateral trade seen pre- Mavi Marmara. 
Furthermore, although military activities were cancelled after Mavi Marmara, de-
fence contracts were not. Just a month after this incident, Turkey’s $183 million 
contract with Israeli Aerospace Industries and Elbit was fulfilled. Similarly, the 
multiple partnerships between Turkish and Israeli firms, particularly in the ar-
eas of defence, automotive and technology industries, continue unabated, such 
as the deal between Turkish Aselsan and Israeli Military Industries to upgrade 
47 Wrobel, S., “Investment firm: Divest from Turkey”, The Jerusalem Post, June 6th 2010, 
Available at: http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=177120. 
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battle tanks.48 Similarly, Turkish participation in an Israeli company Better Place’s 
production of the Renault- Nissan Fluence Z.E, and electric cars, which are cur-
rently being manufactured in Bursa continues unhindered.49 Such joint ventures 
are common, although Israeli companies see it as in their best interests to conceal 
their identity whilst working in Turkey by cooperating with Turkish manufactur-
ers. This means Israeli products are expansive in Turkey, particularly regarding 
medical and advanced software technology, although this is not obvious in the 
manufacturing details. Despite the post- Mavi Marmara ban on cooperation in the 
fields of water and energy, much of the equipment used for agricultural and water 
technology is supplied by Israel directly to local Turkish administrations.50 The 
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) spoke out in 2012 about such 
ties, encouraging greater integration with and business cooperation with Israel, 
citing it as a priority investment partner.51 Thus, the integrated partnerships be-
tween Turkish and Israeli private companies would seem to be superseding politi-
cal conflict but also, if dependency theorists are right, making the risks of it greater 
as Turkey and Israel become more economically, if not politically or ideationally 
interdependent.
If this is beginning to look like a praising account of the invisible hand thesis, it 
is not. Such economic progress has been intimately linked to government control 
and encouragement, even at a time when Erdoğan and Netanyahu have sought 
to distance themselves from each other ideationally and politically. An example 
of this can be found in 2012, when Halman Aldubi, an Israeli investment firm, 
announced that it would divest from Turkey in reaction to Turkey’s objection to 
the Mavi Marmara incident, stating that “Turkey is on a militant path aimed at 
strategically damaging Israel, and there is no reason for Israeli investment houses 
to help the Turkish economy.”52 They urged other investment houses to coordinate 
with this plan, until Turkey adopts a new, more pro- Israeli policy. This was fol-
lowed swiftly by pressure from Uriel Lynn on the business sector to refrain from 
letting political relations damage economic ones. This statement was made in co-
ordination with a call for his Turkish counterpart; Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, president 
of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, to do the same. Incidentally, 
Hisarcıklıoğlu has repeatedly assured that political instability will not damage the 
48 Enginsoy, U., “Turkey’s Military programs with Israel Remain in Place”, Hürriyet 
Daily News, June 3rd 2010, Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/default.
aspx?pageid=438&n=military- programs- with- israel- remain- in- place- 2010- 06- 03. 
49 Gultekin, B., “Turkey- Israel: Toward a Decoupling of Economics from Politics”, 
Hürriyet Daily News, July 9th 2011, Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mid-
east/R41275.pdf. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Yinanc, B., “Top Bosses Eye Smart Investments”, Hürriyet Daily News, March 21st 
2012, Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/top- bosses- eye- smart- 
investments.aspxpageID=238&nID=16499&NewsCatID=345. 
52 Wrobel, S. Op cit.
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ever increasingly economic ties between these two countries. Such statements 
seem to be in effect as Turkish contracting and consultancy in Israel reached $1.03 
billion in 2011, with investment increasing concurrently.53 As Turkey emerged in 
2011 as Israel’s 6th largest export market,54 the necessities of such statements are 
resoundingly clear. Furthermore, the context of the global financial crisis and par-
ticularly, European recession is crucial here. As previously discussed, Turkey is 
attempting to develop, at least partially, a post- EU economic outlook given their 
enduring economic vulnerability. Turkey’s recent recovery from the catastrophic 
2001 financial crisis necessitates stable economic relations, and internationalised, 
diversified investment and exports. Israel is a crucial market in this regards (al-
though still only 17th largest export market for Turkey in 201155), and vice versa 
due to both of their reliance on exporting to Europe, and the increased risk posed 
by diminishing markets in Europe. Thus, economic ties, as opposed to the military 
relations of the 1990s, seem to be the dominant and defining feature of Turkish- 
Israeli relations in the new millennium.
The US- Turkey- Israel triad is also exemplary of the second point of this chapter, 
that despite public opinion necessitating the secession of diplomatic relations, mili-
tary and economic necessities supersede ideational factors in many circumstances. 
This can be seen most recently as, after pressure from the U.S, the Israeli Ministry 
of Defence dropped the newly established block on sales of weapons and defence 
technology to Turkey. This ban, according to a Turkish defence procurement of-
ficial, was aimed at punishing Turkey, however the Israeli MoD “eventually came 
to the conclusion that this would only harm their own interests,” further asserting 
that “At stake was the corporate reputation of Israeli weapons makers.”56 With 
two of Israel’s main defence companies and U.S weapons makers; Elta and Elbit, 
having lost $55 million and $90 million respectively,57 it seems hardly surprising 
that it became evident that continuing the ban would be detrimental to both Israeli 
and U.S economic interests. Furthermore, in terms of Turkish- U.S strategic coop-
eration, Turkey’s membership in NATO and its geo- strategic significance mean 
that withholding the AEW&C defence systems from Turkey (and thus, implicitly 
NATO), which shares borders with two of the most dangerous countries in the 
world in U.S and Israel eyes; Iran and Syria, was not a pragmatic reaction to dip-
lomatic difficulties.
53 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, Available at: http://www.economy.gov.tr/
index.cfmsayfa=countriesandregions&country=IL&region=4. 
54 Cagaptay, Soner, and Tyler Evans, “The Unexpected Vitality of Turkish- Israeli 
Trade”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2012, p. 2.
55 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, Op cit. 
56 Bekdil, B., “Israel abandons block on sales to Turkish AWACS”, Hürriyet Daily 
News, February 22nd 2013, Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/israel- 
abandons- block- on- sales- to- turkish- awacs.aspxPageID=238&NID=41633&NewsCa
tID=344. 
57 Ibid. 
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As the above examples demonstrate, we can see that despite the relative 
 autonomy of private companies from political fluctuations, this is not an all- 
encompassing rule. The Israeli court’s decision to freeze the assets of Turkish 
company, Yılmazlar, came under harsh criticism from the Turkish Foreign Trade 
Minister, Zafer Çaglayan, who requested that the Israeli government stops confus-
ing political relations with commercial ties.58 This highlights the underlying ra-
tionale behind the dichotomy between economic and political relations with  Israel, 
with Turkey perceiving them as separate and abstract affairs. Thus, whilst the 
effect of political relations on trade on the Turkish side can still be said to be negli-
gible, the same cannot be said for the tourism industry which has suffered palpable 
losses since 2010. Consequently, the main domestic impact of frozen diplomatic re-
lations is significant damage to the previously thriving tourism industry between 
Turkey and Israel. Turkish Tourism Minister, Ertuğrul Günay stated that; “We have 
lost a total of 400,000 [people] from Israel.”59 This is unsurprising given that the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry warned, from the day of the flotilla incident onwards, that 
citizens should not travel to Turkey due to fear over “outbreaks of violence against 
Israelis.”60 Such warnings have continued into 2012, in which Ministry statements 
advise against non- essential travel to Turkey. As a result of this, Turkey’s tourism 
industry is suffering hundreds of millions of U.S dollars in lost revenue.
Furthermore, despite well achieved growth rates, the level of trade between 
these two countries still falls short of Turkey’s other neighbours such as Iran and 
the EU, although this can largely be attributed to the size of the markets. However, 
this can also be viewed in historical context as due to the fragile nature of Turkish- 
Israeli political relations and lack of effective investment lobbies. Similarly, since 
much of the imports from Israel are of a military nature, and thus distinctly sep-
arate from civil- society, increasing societal influence on foreign policy orienta-
tion is going to mirror their consumer trends, which are not overtly directed at 
Israel. The AKP’s increased efforts of civilianisation, in an attempt to “confine 
the army to their barracks”,61 and subsequent de- securitisation of foreign- policy 
leaves much less room for Israel in the new millennium than during the golden 
age, wherein, despite having an avowedly anti- Israeli government, security reali-
ties and military power necessitated good relations with Israel. Thus, as we have 
argued, the democratic development pursued by the AKP and the realignment of 
58 “Silk Road Economy & Business Report 2010.06.11 – 2010.06.17”, Silk Road Founda-
tion, 2010. p. 53.
59 “Turkey sees 2 mln drop in tourism due to crises”, Hürriyet Daily News, August 21st 
2012, Available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/turkey- sees- 2- mln- drop- in- 
tourism- due- tocrises.aspxpageID=238&nID=28215&NewsCatID=379. 
60 Blumenkrant, Z., “Israelis Told to Avoid Turkey Travel, but Not Everybody Takes 
Heed,” Haaretz, June 1, 2010, Available at, http://www.haaretz.com/print- edition/
news/israelis- told- to- avoid- turkey- travel- but- not- everybody- takes- heed- 1.293410. 
61 Posch, W., “Crisis in Turkey: just another bump on the road to Europe?”, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007. p. 12. 
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foreign- policy to fit, in part, with societal demands effectively laid the foundations 
for the downgrading of Turkish- Israeli relations, even before the series of dramatic 
events that was Operation Cast Lead, Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident began 
the diplomatic ice age. As Davutoğlu points out; “Turkey is a living example of 
how important it is to expand the space of freedoms to realize the full potential of a 
society. Turkey has, in this regard, also managed to de- securitise its foreign policy 
understanding, which allows us to see our neighbourhood through the prism of op-
portunities rather than a perception of threat.”62 The post- liberalisation emergence 
of society as a foreign- policy actor had a significant impact on the development 
of Turkey’s moral/ethical discourse regarding human (and particularly Palestin-
ian) rights. These societal influences have also stimulated other policies, which 
in this context, have emerged as economic growth, renewing relations with vital 
economic partners such as Iran and Russia, with whom Turkey has vast amounts 
of trade and also a no- visa agreement. Both of these developments are particularly 
alienating regarding the continuation of Turkish- Israeli ties. Thus, it would seem 
that the best opportunity for the successful revival of diplomatic ties is through 
more extensive trade cooperation.
The recent discovery of an estimated 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas just 
off the coast of Israel and Cyprus forms yet another impelling reason for Ankara to 
tone down the rhetoric, a necessity if it is to continue attempts to establish itself as 
a regional energy hub and diversify its energy imports, both of which would be se-
verely inhibited by Turkey’s alienation from Israel. If Turkey mends relations with 
Israel and takes part in this joint venture, a more stable and enduring strategic/
economic partnership could be on the horizon. Further to this, the ever intractable 
conflict over Cyprus poses as strategic threat to Turkey’s energy aspirations as the 
possibility of a Cypriot- Greek- Israeli “axis” becomes increasingly likely. Turkey 
briefly experience of this possibility in 2010 when the Greek- Cypriot government 
began drilling activities under the protection of the Israeli marine and air force.63 
The consequences of such an alliance would likely entrench Turkish- Iranian en-
ergy relations and further threaten Israel both strategically and ideationally. The 
geopolitics of West Asian energy resources are beyond the scope of this chapter, 
however it is important to note that given the Persian basin and the Caspian region 
contain two- thirds of the worlds proven petroleum reserves, links between Turkey 
and Iran are imperative. Israel needs to read this as part of the strategic move to 
become a regional transit hub, rather than as a symbol of Muslim alliances which 
exclude Israel’s participation and damage Turkish- Israeli relations.
Energy is a potent political issue in Turkey as much of the nations debt it due to 
their complete reliance on oil and gas imports. Coming almost entirely from Iran 
and Russia, and at no good price, gas in Turkey is more expensive than anywhere 
62 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Interview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu”, Op cit. 
63 “Turkey in 2011”, SETA Policy Report, SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and 
Social Research, www.setav.org | January 2012. 
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else in the world, a constant thorn in the AKP’s side as it creates a considerable 
amount of public animosity. Israel’s recent discovery of natural gas just of their 
Eastern Mediterranean coast forms yet another impelling reason to increase trade 
cooperation between the two countries. The Tamar field along holds an estimated 
8.5 trillion cubic feet of gas and exports have already begun. The Leviathan field 
will not be in production for around 3 years but holds an estimated 18 trillion cubic 
feet. Israel is equally reliant on Turkey due to its natural suitability as a transport 
hub between West Asia and Europe. Thus the recent attempts at reconciliation 
between the two countries can be seen as a result of energy and trade necessities, a 
more pressing concern due to Turkey’s booming economy, and thus abundant and 
low- cost export opportunities as well as Israel’s ever increasing regional insecurity 
since the Arab spring and lack of viable alternative options due Greece and Cy-
prus’s economic collapse. Trade superseding political difficulties can once again be 
brought attention to as although this may have been a factor in Israel’s surprising 
apology, export contracts were already being signed before this event, once again 
highlighting Turkey’s willingness or need to continue economic links with Israel 
despite political turmoil.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified the crucial variables and actors defining Turkish- Israeli 
bilateral relations, revealing relations to be both complex and relatively shallow. 
It has evaluated the dichotomy between political discourse and economic practice 
and found it to be both stark and unsurprising, given the global and domestic 
socio- political and economic variables affecting the relationship. Thus, despite the 
vitriolic language, particularly from Turkey, the continued level of economic ties 
between the two countries would seem to indicate that, except for a few core ex-
amples, practice rarely follows closely to rhetoric. Similarly, the continued growth 
and the way such economic relations were established, under AKP jurisdiction, 
goes a way to critiquing the shifting axis theory which both simplifies and Orien-
talises the decision making process in Turkey. The deterioration of Turkish- Israeli 
relations are very revealing regarding both domestic transformations, the nature 
of the AKP’s power and their foreign- policy objectives, as well as regional devel-
opments. Diplomatic tensions and the subsequent deterioration of relations did 
not occur in isolation. It has been argued that such transformations were created 
and engendered through social and political discourse and practice, on both sides 
of the divide, and thus, international relations cannot be abstracted from the social 
domestic processes which define it. The deterioration in Turkish- Israeli relations 
cannot be attributed to ideological divides, or indeed, any of the oft employed 
dichotomies. The fluctuations in Turkish foreign- policy making are instead reflec-
tive of the changing political opportunity structure resulting from civilianisation 
and de- securitisation in the AKP era, as well as a changing political structure in 
Turkey. Nor are either side’s changes as pre- meditated as they are portrayed to be. 
This chapter argues that since the arguable demise of “zero problems”, Davutoğlu 
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is formulating foreign- policy in a somewhat ad- hoc way, responding to situations 
as and when they arise with limited thought as to the long term implications of 
controversial decision making, particularly regarding Israel. Thus, the dynamics of 
Turkish- Israeli relations are influenced by innumerable social, political and eco-
nomic forces, both endogenous and exogenous. Notably, the formulation of foreign 
policy is intimately linked to fluctuating event interpretation, actor and threat per-
ception and social processes of historical memory. Theoretically, analysis of the 
fluctuating political opportunity structure and decision making process in Turkey 
is rewarding. It eschews the dominant realist paradigm and highlights the need 
for socio- political and cultural analysis which leaves room for understanding the 
complex and interdependent relationship between the public sphere and interna-
tional relations.
Furthermore, there appears to be a significant degree of continuity rather 
than change in Turkish- Israeli relations. From this analysis, the so- called golden 
era presents itself as more of an anomaly than current turbulent relations. The 
loss of enthusiasm regarding Turkish- Israeli relations can be attributed to wide- 
ranging environmental factors, the most important of which is the perception of 
diplomatic relations to be detrimental to Turkey’s standing in the Arab world, 
and also, to public opinion. Concurrently, Davutoğlu’s strategic depth perception 
seems to have determined such relations to be somewhat unnecessary to the con-
tinuation of the necessary military and economic partnerships. The move away 
from Israel, and implicitly, the U.S, despite its mediation efforts, represents a 
changing paradigm in Turkish Foreign Policy formation in the new millennium, 
based on autonomous and increasingly self- confident policy- making grounded 
in strategic, geopolitical, economic and also, to an extent, ideational realities. 
The U.S has attempted intense negotiation to re- establish the Turkish- U.S- Israeli 
axis of the glory days, to no avail until very recently. This highlights that the 
perceived victory of U.S diplomacy may be no such thing at all as environmental 
factors both in and around the two countries seems mainly have dictated both 
the deliverance and acceptance of the apology. Similarly, the core issues prevent-
ing the full re- establishment of diplomatic relations; namely that none of the 
reconciliation criteria has actually been fulfilled as yet, Abbas’ recent success at 
the U.N and the aftermath of settlement expansion are simply too substantial. 
Combined with the AKP’s will to distance itself from the U.S administration, 
in order to depart from what is perceived by the Turkish public as an enduring 
tradition of American puppetry in West Asia, the chance that the U.S can play 
a mediating role between Turkey and Israel, rather than simply directing Israel 
as seems to have been the case most recently, is negligible, compared with the 
much more impelling internal issues which seem to have delivered some kind of 
resolution in this matter.
Turkish previous resistance to U.S. reconciliation attempts must be contextu-
alised within a few core global and local transformations; first of all, the global 
financial crisis which has undermined U.S and EU economic hegemony whilst 
simultaneously allowing for the opportunity of emerging economies such as 
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Turkey to take a more active and autonomous economic and political role. The 
implications of which are as discussed above, but most notably, the development 
of strong economic ties and improving diplomatic relations with countries ag-
gressive to Israel, notably Iran, Syria and Palestine. The second important issue 
relates to domestic transformations. The on- going tug- of- war over political iden-
tities within Turkey necessitates the use of foreign- policy as an electoral tool. By 
invoking populist discourse and developing a more reactive foreign- policy, Tur-
key may well have demonstrated their democratic capacity, however, potentially 
at the risk of long term gains. Constructing such a strong anti- Israeli national 
narrative now means that opportunities for negotiation and diplomatic relations 
are severely constrained by public opinion. The rise of civil, rather than coercive 
military power in Turkey has had a dramatic effect on the objectives and imple-
mentation of foreign- policy. The effects expand regionally, as Turkey increases 
efforts to portray itself as a model in post- revolutionary Arab Spring countries, 
part of which hinges on maintaining a credible and democratic position towards 
Israel, which at this stage, entails ideological distance and populist discourse. 
Contrasts, between actions and rhetoric, should be perceived as demonstrative of 
the difficult tight- rope which the AKP must negotiate. At once, they are subject 
to the ebb and flow of public opinion, particularly due to the rise of civil- society 
and private corporate actors with varied interests. Simultaneously, they must 
balance these social demands with the demands of being a prominent actor in the 
international system, maintaining an equilibrium between the varied opportuni-
ties and constraint posed by the Arab Spring and the dramatic economic changes 
of the last ten years.
Turkey has a promising role as regional mediator and potentially, benign he-
gemon (if such a thing can exist), utilising “soft power” to stabilise its volatile 
regional environment. However, Turkey must rekindle its relationship with Is-
rael if it is to have the continued support of the U.S and the EU, both important 
to the effective extension of Turkish “soft power” or implementation of the “zero 
problems” policy. The very emergence of Turkey in this role reflects the rapid 
transformations of Turkey’s traditionally insular foreign policy of the Kemalist 
era. Turkey’s active mediation of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict is one of the 
core reasons for such one sided rhetoric now, due to the failures of such ac-
tivities and the attribution of blame to Israel. Given this chapter argues that 
the transformation of Turkish foreign- policy towards Israel in the AKP era has 
been part of a bottom up, societal transformation, the same could be said of the 
solution. Increasing economic, intellectual and cultural ties between these two 
countries should lay a much better foundation than the tenuous military basis of 
the “golden age” allegiance. The social and psychological damage caused by the 
main encounters discussed in this chapter will not dissolve independently. If the 
AKP is to re- establish relations with Israel in a more durable and open fashion, 
they must transform societal attitudes in concurrence with the development of 
their own rhetoric and policy, which is in accordance both with society and with 
Turkey’s larger regional role.
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